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ABSTRACT
This thesis, entitled “Skilled Emigration and the Sending State: Using
Engineering as a Case Study in Egypt,” was completed by Marise Habib, under the
supervision of Dr. Ray Jureidini, at the American University in Cairo. The thesis
explores the impact of skilled emigration on Egypt by looking into the migration
intentions of the Class of 2010 from the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University.
Skilled emigration is often considered to be entirely detrimental to sending states as
the loss of highly trained minds is viewed independently and not considered as part of
a broader movement of persons and capital.
Student intentions in this study were gauged using a survey distributed to
students online and on their campus, which posed questions regarding desires to work
abroad, emigrate, reasons behind these intentions, intent to remit and intent to return.
Data gathered was then analyzed in light of existing literature on skilled emigration to
see how the migration intentions of the class studied will affect Egypt in terms of
direct loss if the student is considered an investment, direct gains through remittances
and indirect gains stemming largely from return migration. The thesis then looks at
existing and recommended policies as a way to guide the discussion on moving
forward. It concludes by reiterating that the gains from emigration cannot be
harnessed simply retroactively, but policies and discussions on emigration must be
met with an understanding that systemic and societal education and change, whether
infrastructural, educational or cultural, are necessary to ensure that sending states do
not wind up solely losing in the migration equation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Egyptians have the reputation of preferring their own
soil. Few ever leave except to study or travel; and they
always return … Egyptians do not emigrate” – Wendell
Cleland 1
Wendell Cleland arrived at this conclusion following his research in 1936, but
much has changed in this assertion over the course of the past seven decades. While
the attachment to the homeland insinuated in his statement is still very evident in
Egyptian society today, the political, social and economic changes that have occurred
in the country in the past half century have expanded the reasons behind Egyptian
departure beyond studies and travels. The present study will address the implications
of skilled emigration on Egypt on domestic labor market, costs and social and human
capital acquisition and does so by incorporating data gathered from an original survey
of students from Cairo University's Faculty of Engineering's graduating class, gauging
their migration intentions and reasons driving these, within existing scholarship on
skilled emigration and the sending state. Following an exploration of these effects,
primarily as they pertain to the country economically, the author will discuss policies
that aim to maximize the benefits to Egypt of what can initially be construed as
simple losses of bodies and minds.
Traditionally, discourse on migration deals with sending and receiving states
as separate entities linking them mainly in terms of the migrants themselves, while
still upholding state sovereignty as the dichotomy to distinguish between states. The
nature of migration, however, stands in clear defiance of such a dichotomy
underscoring the “more fluid, transnational (although not deterritorialized) existence
1

Wendell Cleland, The Population Problem in Egypt: A Study of Population Trends and Conditions in
Modern Egypt (Lancaster, PA: Science Press Printing Company, 1936).
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that characterizes many of today’s migrants” 2 . The maintenance of strong ties by the
migrant to their home country generates the need to observe the effect of emigration
on development in the sending state. While development as a term is clearly
problematic in itself, here it will be discussed in terms of economic stimulus.
Following a description of the methods used in this study to determine the
migration intentions of the sample population of university students, Chapter 1 will
introduce the historical migration context within which migration policies in Egypt
have emerged and the existing legal framework that governs migration for Egyptians
today. Chapter 2 then begins with an analysis of the traditional patterns of migration
for Egyptians, followed by an introduction of the sample population, their intended
destinations and their reasons for emigrating. These contextual introductions will pave
the way for Chapter 3 in which skilled migration is addressed in terms of its actual
costs for the sending state, and its effect on the distribution of labor. The survey
sample’s intentions to emigrate are analyzed here in light of existing data on
unemployment in the field of engineering in Egypt to determine whether recent
graduates have a realistic grasp on market provision of positions for new entrants.
Chapter 4 follows with a discussion of the potential gains for the sending state
stemming from emigration, by first discussing the direct monetary gains deriving
from monies remitted by the diaspora, and then considering the ripple benefits for the
market of return migration. Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a general discussion of
existing policies addressing emigration from Egypt, and discuss a few policies that
Egypt could adopt, which it has considered in some cases, to minimize potential loss
from the skilled emigration discussed in this thesis.

2

Laurie Brand, "Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa,"
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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While it appears counter intuitive to consider the emigration of a state’s skilled
minds in a positive light, this thesis aims to analyze how, despite the immediate loss
of educated minds to foreign states, a sending country, namely Egypt in this instance,
can benefit from skilled emigration in the short-run as a method of alleviating
domestic unemployment problems until better regulating policies are put in place for
the long-run that can enhance the use of skilled minds to better meet the demands of
the domestic labor market.
1.1 Methodology
The sample population for this survey consists of students in their final year of
study in the Faculty of Engineering at Cairo University (CU). This university was
selected as it requires the highest results in the national secondary school exams of
any public university in Cairo to earn acceptance into their Faculties of Engineering.
The current study results are therefore based on the responses of 115 (CU)
Engineering students in their final year of study to the research survey (Appendix A)
and on the information shared by the students, and their colleagues falling outside the
study parameters, in informal group conversations following the administration of the
survey 3 .

3

The initial intention of the study was to include two public and one private university, namely Ain
Shams University, Cairo University and the American University in Cairo respectively. These
universities were chosen to represent both the top ranking private and public institutions with faculties
of Engineering in Cairo. However, after initial efforts showed that reaching a representative sample of
one particular graduating class (specifically that of 2010) across all three universities would prove
nearly impossible for the researcher alone, the sample population was narrowed to focus on only the
class graduating from Cairo University. The overall sample reached by the researcher consisted of 442
students and recent graduates from universities across Cairo in addition to Alexandria University. Over
half of the responses gathered were drawn from Cairo University, while another 15.8% came from Ain
Shams, 16.3% from the American University in Cairo and 12.1% from Alexandria University.
Appendix C: Survey Answers for Primary Universities Sampled provides the answers given to the
survey questionnaire for the population of students reached from each of the primary universities
sampled to illustrate whether the same patterns found in the Cairo University students are reflected in
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The 115 students represent approximately 5% of the graduating class of
engineers from CU 4 , and can reasonably be considered representative of the opinions
of this class as responses were monitored throughout the collection stage to ensure
that the final sample population’s opinions and intentions were converging as the
research progressed.
The research survey consists of questions addressing the students’ intent to
migrate or remain and aims to enable the researcher to determine whether students
have realistic expectations surrounding migration and ascertain which students have
seriously considered the subject preceding the survey by asking more detailed
questions about expected costs and plans upon arrival in the destination country. The
survey questions also try to address the nuances of the migration experience by
requesting that students divulge their motivations for departure if they intend to leave,
whether this decision is for permanent migration or temporary, what networks exist in
their destination countries, as well as what financial costs and benefits they expect to
experience through their decision to migrate.
The survey was designed in English, edited several times, translated into
Arabic and translated back into English to ensure that the meaning behind each of the
questions was uniform. In order to gather data on the migration intentions of a
representative sample of the student body, the research survey was administered to
students both online and in person on the CU campus. Both the online survey and the
paper survey were generated using surveymonkey.com 5 , a web site specializing in
survey design that facilitated the creation of a portable document format (PDF) that

the overall student/recent graduate population, recognizing that this larger sample is not representative
of the intentions of the overall student population at each of these universities.
4
Based on the student body information found in Cairo University, 2008.
5
http://www.surveymonkey.com/.
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was still easy to read and user-friendly for the in person survey administration. In
order to ensure that there would be no language barriers hindering the success of the
survey, each question and answer was written in both English and Arabic side by side
so that students would not need to choose one over the other and could refer to either
at any point.
To reach the initial broader sample population, the researcher used class email
lists, by requesting them from Deans, professors, students and/or IT personnel from
each of the Faculties, if such email lists are used regularly by the students and alumni
at each of the target universities, with a link to the survey for students to take on their
own time. The online reach was the initial step in the administration of the survey as it
allowed the researcher to begin to see patterns emerging that assisted in the
formulation of questions for the students surveyed in person, which the researcher
asked in informal group discussions following the administration of the survey.
The in-person surveys were in effect administered using a diversified snowball
method, whereby the researcher sought out students from different groups within the
graduating class at CU and requested that they either administer it to their classmates
or inform as many students within their reach about the survey and encourage them to
complete it (whether virtually by providing their email address, or on campus). In
order to avoid duplicate surveys, the students were requested to provide a mobile
number that was used only for identification purposes as names may be duplicated.
The mix of responses gathered from both the snowball survey method and the online
sample should alleviate network biases in the results that could arise from utilizing
only the snowball method, and accessibility issues that could have come from using
only the online survey.
14

Data from the survey was funneled directly through surveymonkey—
immediately for those taking the survey online and manually for the responses
collected on CU’s campus. The web site was then also used as the primary tool for the
data analysis, as it permitted the researcher to apply filters to see respondents fitting
only a specific set of criteria easily and cross-tabulate student answers to identify
trends in intentions to migrate.
1.2 Country Migration Context
Wendell Cleland’s assertion was likely valid until the 1950s when Egyptian
emigration really began 6 . The "military revolution of 1952 tipped the balance of
power among the country's ethnic groups in favor of the native majority,"
economically and politically, in part by employing nationalization and sequestration
laws, resulting in the large-scale emigration of British and French groups initially,
followed by a slow but steady migration of Greek and Italians, and of Jews following
1956 7 . From the early 1960s, members of the Coptic community began to emigrate
for fear of increased discrimination 8 and a permanent migration of Egyptians began
for social, political and economic reasons 9 . Additional nationalization laws the
following decade led to the emigration of the Syrio-Lebanese and Armenian
communities remaining 10 . Egypt’s early emigration patterns went through three
distinct phases differing in their makeup and destinations. The phase spanning from
1965 to 1975 was characterized by skilled and unskilled teachers and construction

6

Ayman Zohry Barbara Harrell-Bond, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration," (Cairo: Forced Migration
and Refugee Studies Programme, American University in Cairo, 2003).
7
Fouad Assad, "Egyptians - Migration," The Encyclopedia of Canada's People.
8
Ibid.
9
Howaida Roman, "Emigration Policy in Egypt," in Cooperation project on the social integration of
immigrants, migration, and the movement of persons (European University Institute, 2006).
10
Assad, "Egyptians - Migration."
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workers heading mainly to the GCC states and Libya 11 . The numbers of emigrants
remained low until 1974 following the oil boom in the Gulf and Libya that allowed
for development programs to be implemented. Also at this time, in 1971, the Egyptian
government lifted restrictions on labor migration which was necessary to enable
Egyptian workers to emigrate per Article 52 of the Egyptian Constitution that states
that citizens have the right to permanent or temporary migration as regulated by the
terms set forth by law 12 . Law 73 then mandated a right for all public sector and
government employees to return to their positions within a year of having submitted
their resignation, later extending this right to two years following resignation while
also removing other potential impediments to Egyptian migration 13 . These actions
facilitated the second phase of migration, from 1975-1985, which was composed
mainly of unskilled rural migrant workers in agriculture and construction going over
to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq 14 . In 1975, there were 370,000 Egyptian migrants
working in the Arab region, out of a total of about 655,000 globally. This total
number had reached over a million by 1980. By 1983, demand peaked and an
estimated 3.28 million Egyptian workers were abroad. The demand declined again
after 1983 with the changing political and economic situation in the Arab oilproducing states 15 .
The decline of emigration carried through to the next phase of migration, from
1985 to 1995, when the makeup of the migrants shifted back to include skilled and
unskilled migrants, but differing from the first phase in the professions departing as
11

Leila Simona Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point
of Departure: The Case of Egypt," (The British Academy, 2003).
12
"The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt," (1971); Ayman Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the
European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen," (Danish Institute for International
Studies, 2006).
13
Ayman Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration," IOM and Cooperazione Italiana (2003).
14
Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure:
The Case of Egypt."
15
Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen."
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this phase was composed of scientists and agriculture workers, working in Saudi
Arabia 16 . In 1986, the number of Egyptian workers abroad has dropped to 2.25
million and remained at around this level through the early 1990s 17 . The 1996 census
indicated a slight rise back in the Egyptian emigrant numbers, placing them at
approximately 2.8 million 18 . The number now seems to have risen slightly over the
average for the third phase, with national estimates recording about 2.7 million
Egyptian workers abroad in 2003, and between 3 and 5 million in 2006 19 . The
Egyptian migrant population therefore makes up approximately 4 percent of Egypt’s
total population, and about 1.5 percent of the migrant population overall.
Approximately two-thirds of Egyptian migration is considered temporary and
involved migration to one of the oil-rich Arab states. Within this type of migration,
about half of the migrants are absorbed by Saudi Arabia 20 .
1.3 Laws Governing Migration in Egypt
Egyptian migration policy has only been stated concretely once, in 1983, with
the introduction of the “Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law” no. 111,
which was to be implemented by the Ministry for Manpower and Emigration and
covered provisions for both permanent and temporary migrants 21 . While no other
document comprehensively addresses the Egyptian government’s aims and obligation

16

Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure:
The Case of Egypt."
17
Zohry, "Egyptian Youth and the European Eldorado: Journeys of Hope and Despair. Copenhagen."
18
Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration."
19
Barbara Harrell-Bond, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration."; Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their
Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure: The Case of Egypt."; Ayman Zohry,
"Attitudes of Egyptian Youth Towards Migration to Europe," in Information Dissemination on
Migration (2006).
20
Talani, "Why Do Migrants Leave Their Countries? Motivations to Migrate at the Point of Departure:
The Case of Egypt."
21
Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration."
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as they pertain to migration, the actions, policies and statements made by policy
makers imply the following as their primary goals for Egyptian migration:
1. Encouraging emigration to ensure equilibrium in the domestic labor
market;
2. Fighting illegal migration;
3. Maximizing the economic benefits of migration and increasing migrants’
remittances;
4. Ensuring the welfare of emigrants; and
5. Meeting labor demand in receiving countries. 22
Law no.111 places under the auspices of the appropriate minister the task of
identifying migrants as either permanent or temporary, and recommends that, through
consultation with appropriate other ministries, courses be established to prepare
potential migrants for their voyage and work in the host country, and to ensure that
cultural and religious heritage are saved in some manner among the migrant
communities abroad23 . The Higher Committee for Migration (HCM), created in 1997
by Prime Minister Resolution no. 2000 to fulfill Article 4 of Law no. 111 24 , was
intended to not only provide for these pre-departure needs and maintain strong ties
with Egyptian migrants abroad, but also facilitate both temporary and permanent
return 25 . Currently, the HCM serves predominantly as a policy and liaison
committee 26 , and has not reached its intended audience domestically as evidenced by
the slim 5.5% of respondents in the current research study who list the Egyptian
government as one of the resources they have utilized in their search for information
about their intended destination countries.
22

Ayman Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France," (Florence: EuroMediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM), Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2009).
23
Zohry, "Contemporary Egyptian Migration."
24
The HCM, as outlined in Article 4 of Law no. 111, is to be composed at minimum of representatives
from the Ministries of Education and Scientific Research, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy,
Planning, Defense, Information, Tourism and Civil Aviation, Insurance, and Finance. "Emigration and
Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111," Egyptian Government (1983).
25
Article 5, Ibid.
26
Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France."
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The year preceding the formation of the HCM the responsibilities of the
Minister of State for Emigration Affairs and Egyptians Abroad were transferred by
Presidential Decree no. 165 to what is now the Ministry of Manpower and
Emigration, thereby also shifting the leadership of the HCM to the Minister.
The current strategy of the Emigration Sector focuses on two dimensions; first,
developing work systems by introducing new technologies to establish an
updated Egyptian Migration database that includes job opportunities abroad as
well as numbers and statistics, and a computerized system through the Internet
to link Egyptians abroad to their homeland. The second dimension of the
Emigration Sector strategy is to reinforce the role of the “Union of Egyptians
Abroad” and other civil society organizations that represent Egyptians outside
the homeland. 27
To attain its goals, the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration has worked in
conjunction with foreign governments and international organizations. The Italian
government, for instance, funded the creation of the Migration Information System
during the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) project in which the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) was the implementing party 28 . The
pilot project, which was conducted from 2001-2004, was intended to create a means
by which migratory flows could be controlled while simultaneously ensuring ease of
integration for Egyptians intending to emigrate 29 . The outputs of the project consisted
of a website with job opportunities abroad also serving as a portal for Egyptian
migrants overall. The 1,605,659.22 € grant enabled the creation of an information
platform, currently highlighting France, Italy, Norway and Spain, to which migrants
and potential migrants can refer 30 . It also quite notably created a job matchmaking
service meant to provide a platform through which Egyptian job seekers and Italian
entrepreneurs and employers were able to find one another easily for clear mutual
27

Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Italian Cooperation in Egypt, "Http://Www.Utlcairo.Org/English/Progetti/Progetti/11.Html."
30
Zohry, "The Migratory Patterns of Egyptians in Italy and France."
28
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benefit. 1,500 applicants, out of an applicant pool of 170,000, were selected for
interviews for positions ranging from assistant cook, to construction workers to
engineers, and 178 were chosen to work in Italy and received 3 months of language
training prior to their departure 31 . Despite the very low number of successful
candidates, the initial mass of applications indicates a demand a placement service
that would provide migrants with an accessible legal mode of accessing their desired
country of destination, while also benefiting the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and
Emigration in that it will now be more involved in the migration of its citizens of
concern from stage one.
The strategy of information provision as a means of regulating migration
flows into Italy also served as the basis for the implementation of the “Information
Dissemination for the Prevention of Irregular Migration from the Arab Republic of
Egypt” project launched in 2006/7. This project however uses information about legal
modes of emigration in addition to providing more realistic views of the realities of
emigration, rather than direct entry job placements, to deter illegal migration 32 . The
steadily increasing restrictions “by the Schengen agreements, the third pillar on justice
and Home affairs, the Dublin Convention, and the few legislative provisions more
recently adopted under the new title on migration instituted by the Amsterdam
Treaty” have lead to an increase in irregular migration in the EU as well as a
“progressive ‘securitisation’ of migration”, whereby migration itself is viewed as a
security issue necessitating the attention of security agencies 33 . A comparative study
by Eurostat found that of the Egyptian respondents, almost none had attempted to
enter or remain in a host country illegally. Six percent successfully attempted
31

Ibid.
Ibid.
33
Leila S. Talani, "Out of Egypt: Globalisation, Marginalisation and Illegal Muslim Migration to the
Eu" (Los Angeles, CA, 2005).
32

20

undocumented migration, with 24% heading to each Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan,
10% to Italy and another 10% to other EU countries. The countries of choice for
undocumented migration mirrored the routes for migrants traveling legally. The 10%
of those who said they had arrived or stayed undocumented who chose Italy as their
destination, compose 40% of the total number of Egyptian respondents in Italy 34 . The
two most common means of undocumented entry for Egyptians entering into Italy are
first, “entry through Libya to the coasts of Italy or entry through the eastern borders of
Schengen zone,” and second, regular entry by securing a tourist or business “visit
visa,” and overstaying to work undocumented aided by networks in Italy. The latter
option, while favorable as the safer mode of entry, is also the more expensive
option 35 .
The law has also put forth regulations to attempt to further harness the
potential developmental gains that could arise from the large sums being remitted
back into Egypt every year. It aims to address the exact infrastructural fears that may
lead migrant families to shy away from investing within the state, since remittance
income constitutes approximately 21 percent of foreign investment within Egypt 36 .
The law notes migrant rights to sponsorship and grants exemptions from taxes and
fees on the returns earned by emigrants on their investments in Egyptian banks.
Furthermore, “migrants’ capital utilized in investment projects in Egypt is to be
granted the same advantages granted to foreign capital 37 .
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2. WHO EMIGRATES AND WHERE DO THEY CHOOSE TO GO?
2.1 Traditional Migration Patterns of Egyptians
It is said that Egypt is now experiencing “the permanence of temporary
migration” as the long-standing norm of migrating to the Arab states has turned into
an ever-replenishing presence of an Egyptian labor force within the Arab receiving
states 38 . The remaining third of the existing migrant Egyptian diaspora is
predominantly found in the West, and consists of those whose migration intention is
more permanent 39 . The correlation between Arab state migration and temporary
migration and Western state migration and permanence coincides with the rights
afforded to migrants in their respective destinations. Western states are considered to
afford a path to permanence, through their permissive allowances in rights and
naturalization, thereby attracting those migrants whose departure is meant to be
permanent in nature 40 . Egyptian migrants in the West are disproportionately present
in North America, with slightly over half of the 824,000 migrants in 2000 distributed
between the United States and Canada 41 . European states account for approximately
40 percent of the remaining migrants’ destinations, with Italy and Greece being the
main European destinations and Italy being considered Egyptians’ main destination
for over two decades 42 .
Findings from a 2006 survey of a sample of 1,552 young Egyptian men, aged
18 to 40, showed that the current Egyptian emigration to Europe closely resembled
38
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past migration to Arab states in that migrants set a particular goal that they plan to
achieve and intend to return once they have realized it. The demography of Egyptian
migrants seems much more homogeneous with migrants arising mainly from a
particular “age, sex and educational status. They are predominantly concentrated in
young age groups, with more males than females, and with a relatively high
educational status, especially among those from an urban background” 43 . Most
permanent migrants ranged from 30 to 49 years of age, with this demographic
constituting one third of the total migrant population. A notable distinction however
arose within this age group as migrants aged 30-39 years generally initiated their
permanent migration from Egypt, while the age group ranging from 40-49 acquired
their second nationality after having lived abroad 44 . In a survey conducted by Egypt’s
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in 1987, results indicated that
97.7 percent of migrants stemming from Egypt were male 45 , leaving 76 percent of
sending households to be headed by married women whose spouses were abroad and
remitting back support for their household . 89.8 percent of the migrants were aged
between 20 and 44, with 63.5 percent of emigrants being married 46 .
The recent survey found that most of the push factors were largely economic,
with young migrants hoping to evade bad living conditions, low wages/salaries, lack
of opportunity, unemployment and the income disparities between Egypt and the
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receiving country of choice 47 . On the pull side, youth noted that friends and family in
the host country constituted an important factor in their choice of destination 48 .
Migration of Egyptian youth to Europe is managed and activated by family
kinship and ties while migration of Egyptians to Arab Gulf countries are
usually managed by a set of regulations, certified migration brokers, and many
other conditions. Migration to Europe is concentrated in a set of Egyptian
villages in specific governorates; each village has its own destination; the two
major destinations are Italy and France. 49
These networks influence migrants’ knowledge upon arrival in the country about the
labor market and expected wage rates which enables them to search for higher paid
positions and had been found to decrease the time some migrants spend in the
receiving country. After having accounted for economic situation of the host state and
personal traits of the migrants, it was found that an established network increases the
percentage of migrants who will stay in the host country for less than a year by 11
percent, from 2 to 13 percent 50 . This negative correlation can be attributed to the
lowered initial costs of migrants with a network experience which, when coupled with
these migrants’ access to higher wages as mentioned, enables them to recuperate the
costs tied to their migration much faster, thereby allowing them the option of
returning sooner than persons who do not have access to an established network.
Length of stay also differs by country of destination as most Egyptian
migrants head to Western states intending on migrating permanently, with 55.5
percent of those going to Western Europe and 93 percent of those going to the U.S.
and Australia answering this way, while those migrating to Arab countries all (100
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percent) intend to return to Egypt 51 . Those who intended to migrate more permanently
to a Western state tended to be highly educated/skilled professionals, who were
mainly concentrated in medical, engineering and educational practices 52 . Notably,
however, the skill set of those heading to Western destinations is declining as
compared to that of the migrants to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s as many young
Egyptians are more actively trying to emigrate now because of the increasingly
difficult economic and employment environments, sometimes even turning to
irregular modes of migration in order to escape 53 . Migrants with work contracts in the
host country were also found to spend more time that their counterparts without such
contracts, since their wages in the receiving state are more stable and predictable 54 .
The historical patterns of movement of Egyptian migrants have been well
researched historically, however the effect of Egyptian migratory flows on Egypt
itself is an area that is still in need of particular scrutiny. This research aims to fill a
gap in this knowledge area by looking at the intended migration patterns of a new
generation of migrants in Egypt and discussing the implications, beyond the
traditional discussions of costs and remittances, that affect the sending state in terms
of its domestic labor market and skill set.
2.2 Demographic Makeup of the Sample Population
In his surveys of three Egyptian sending communities, Adams found that
“international migrants were self-selected on the basis of higher education” 55 . The
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analysis of the migratory intentions of this class of engineering students is based on
the sample of 115 students drawn from Cairo University’s graduating class of
approximately 2300 students 56 . The choice of engineering students was based on
several factors, prime among them is the relatively more accessible data on the field
of engineering, which will be necessary in the calculations of the effect of the
intended migration patterns on the labor market in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the
quantifiable nature of the outcomes of engineers’ work, for the most part, makes the
cost-gain analysis for this field easier to define as compared to that for social sciences
graduates. Engineers also contribute to infrastructural growth where they work, and
therefore lost engineers could, in theory, be a great loss for any sending state. For
these reasons, this research chose to focus on the field of engineering as a quantifiable
source of data with the potential to impact both the home and host countries
significantly.
The study sample is composed of 90 men and 25 women ranging in age
between 19 and 25, most of whom (99%) are unmarried. 89% of the students
surveyed are Muslim, and 11% Christian. Of the students surveyed, all but eight were
born in Egypt. Of these only two have a citizenship in another state, but listed that
they were raised in Egypt. Approximately 75% of respondents were raised in Greater
Cairo, while the 25% remaining were raised throughout both Lower and Upper Egypt.
Of those who answered the question regarding family income (101
respondents), the majority (approximately 81%) estimated their household income
56
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was under 7000 EGP/month, with 19% of households bringing in less than 1000
EGP/month. The pool of respondents is therefore composed primarily of students who
are from middle income (30.7%), lower-middle income (31.7%) and lower income
(18.8%) families.
While nearly 100% of the respondents currently rely on family support for
income, with only 3.6% listing work as one of their means of supporting themselves,
the percentages are reversed when students are asked how they will support
themselves following graduation. 100% of the students noted that they intend to
support themselves through their work income. This is particularly notable as the
female respondents, who now entirely rely on family support for their livelihoods
listed only their savings, and not family support as their male counterparts listed, as
the source of income to supplement their employment following graduation. The men
however, specifically those whose household belonged to the middle class or above,
listed both savings and family support as sources of income in addition to their postgraduation employment. Currently, 9.7% of students intend to utilize their savings to
contribute to their own expenditures, and this number decreases slightly to 8%
following graduation.
Of the students surveyed, only 9 have worked outside Egypt before, 7 in
Europe, including one female student, and 2 in other Arab countries.
While the current study will not sufficiently delve into the cultural nuances
that increase the relevance of gender distinctions in the analysis of this data, future
research would benefit from such a focus. Where gender distinctions are highlighted,
they are intended to draw attention to a pattern that the author believes is noteworthy
either because the level of independence in it can be considered out of the ordinary
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within the context of cultural and social norms in Egypt or because the pattern itself
defies traditional gender roles.
2.3 Where does this generation of engineers want to go?
Before entering into a discussion of the emigration intentions of the sample
student population, we must define the terms as they were understood by the sample.
The Arabic translation of emigration (hegra) and that for work abroad (3amal bel
khareg) were both used in the survey to distinguish between the students’ intentions
and to pinpoint whether the trends indicate a desire for permanent or temporary labor
migration. While the term for emigration does imply permanence of migration, it is
often used in Egypt to indicate a longer term temporary migration intention, and
therefore intention to emigrate is analyzed taking into consideration the potential
return of the migrant.
Case in point, of those who answered that they do intend to emigrate, several
responded to the question of whether they intend to return to Egypt permanently after
some time abroad affirmatively, indicating that these particular respondents, while
they do intend to leave Egypt for some time, are thinking of a more temporary
migration rather than final emigration.
The data in
Figure 1 is based on the responses of 86 respondents who noted that they do
intend to work abroad in the future. 77.5% of respondents intend to work abroad at
some point in the future, including one third of the female respondents surveyed. A
few respondents listed several countries/regions, reflected here.
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Figure 1 - Intended Destination Regions for Work
Intended Destination Regions for Work

7%
18%

Anywhere
29%

Arab
Asia
Australia
Europe

21%

North America
Not Specified
1%
2%
22%

21 respondents (18%), including one female student, indicated that they
already have been offered a chance to work abroad, split with 12 having been
promised employment upon arrival and nine holding formal contracts. Of those with
formal contracts, five are bound for Arab states, three for European states and one for
Japan. Of those with promises of employment upon their arrival to the destination
state, 11 were promised these in Arab states while one was headed for the United
States. The differences in intended periods of residence in the receiving states are
notable for this group as they reflect the historical migratory intentions of Egyptians
as they were discussed above. The temporary nature of migration to Arab states is
reflected in this sub-sample of the students who already have employment
opportunities abroad. Those heading to Arab states intend to stay in their destinations
between 2-15 years with an average of slightly over 6 years, with only one intending a
permanent move and two uncertain about the intended duration of their voyage. The
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one respondent headed for Japan is intending on staying between three to five years,
while the one heading to North America is planning to stay for ten years. Of the three
heading to Europe however, only one has limited his stay to five to ten years, while
the other two intend to remain.
Of the students who have found employment abroad of either sort, only three
have had previous work experience, and only two in the country where they intend to
work following graduation. Slightly over half of these students are heading to
countries where they have a network, and will be helped by family and friends across
their home country and the receiving countries; those remaining who are heading to
countries where they do not have a network, listed friends and family in addition to
migration brokers to arrive at their final destination. Only two of the students leaving
for an employment opportunity, one for the UAE and the other for the UK, are
currently taking the equivalence exams to enable them to work in the work in their
receiving country.
When asked about their intentions to emigrate, irrespective of job prospects,
the majority of the sample population responded that they intend to emigrate from
Egypt at some point, with 23.6% planning to do so in 3-5 years, 18.2% saying they do
not yet have concrete plans, and 17.3% planning on leaving within 1-2 years. For
those intending to emigrate, the gender composition was split 90%-10% male to
female. A notably high number of respondents (36.4%), composed nearly evenly of
females, said they did not intend to emigrate. While almost 73% of the male
respondents indicated a desire to emigrate, the female respondents’ answers weighed
nearly just as heavily against emigration, with close to 70% saying they did not have
the intention to emigrate from Egypt in the future. Furthermore, the women who did
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indicate a desire to emigrate had not yet made concrete plans as opposed to the men
whose answers signaled more urgency in their emigration intentions with the bulk of
those emigrating intending to do so within the next five years.
Differences arise when comparing destination countries of those who intend to
leave Egypt for work (
Figure 1) and those who intend on longer term migration (Figure 2). For those
who intend to emigrate, far fewer are undecided, and a sizeable majority is split
between North America and Europe as their desired host. The drop, while not severe,
in those listing the Arab region as their destination for emigration as compared to
those listing it for work is noteworthy as it reflects the traditional thinking that Arab
states are a plausible option for long-term migration as they do not provide a path to
integration as European and North American states offer.
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Figure 2 - Intended Destination Regions for Emigration
Intended Destination Regions for Emigration
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Of those who responded with an intention to emigrate, whether those who had
concrete plans to emigrate within a few years or those who just had the general
intention, 88% noted that they do intend to return to Egypt at some point in the future.
This included several of the women who were not intending on emigrating or working
abroad, perhaps indicating an intention to emigrate for family purposes after marriage,
which would also explain why the women for the most part who do intend to leave
either do not know when their intended departure is, or also state they do not know
how long they will stay abroad. This trend plays into traditional gender roles as well
in that, while the women might have an interest in life abroad, it may not be socially
acceptable for their parents to approve of such a decision before the women are
married. As a question about whether the move is motivate by marriage was not
included in the survey, the discrepancy in the answers discussed above is the only
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indication that societal norms may be the only obstacle preventing these women from
making their own concrete plans for emigration.
Intended duration of stay abroad overall ranged from one year to 20 years for
those who specified, and “Once I make enough money abroad” and “Don’t Know” for
those whose intentions have not been decided beyond the point of departure. The
majority of answers fall within the 3-10 year range, regardless of how soon after
graduation they intend to leave.
2.3.1 Networks
A vast majority of respondents 79.1% know someone who has already
emigrated, with most listing family among those they know abroad, 11.8% listed that
their parents had emigrated previously, and 49.1% noted that members of their
extended families had emigrated. 51.8% said they know a friend who has emigrated.
Since a friend might well be within the same age range as the respondents, it is key to
also look into the migration intentions of the respondents based on whether a friend of
theirs has already emigrated. 77.2% with a friend who has already emigrated intend to
also leave Egypt, with the majority of those (75%) having already decided on a
specific timeline for departure ranging from graduation to 10 years, weighed heavily
toward 5 years or sooner.
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Table 1 - Knowledge of Other Emigrants by Intent to Emigrate
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply) هﻞ ﺗﻌﺮف أﻧﺎس هﺎﺟﺮوا ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ

Answer Options

Yes, my parents  واﻟﺪﻳﺎ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, my brother  أﺧﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, my sister  أﺧﺘﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, a member of my extended
family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد أﺳﺮﺗﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
اﻟﻤﻮﺳﻌﺔ
Yes, a friend  ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﻟﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
No, I don't know anyone who
has emigrated  ﻻ أﻋﺮف أﺣﺪا هﺎﺟﺮ،ﻻ

Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي
اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ؟
Yes, but
No, I
I don’t
Yes, in
Yes, in
Yes, in
do not
have
3-5
6-10
1-2
Yes, this
intend
concrete
years
years
years
year ،ﻧﻌﻢ
to
 ﺧﻼل،ﻧﻌﻢ
 ﺧﻼل، ﻧﻌﻢplans yet
 ﺧﻼل،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺧﻼل هﺬا
emigra
 ﻟﻜﻦ،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺛﻼﺛﺔ إﻟﻰ
ﺳﺘﺔ إﻟﻰ
ﻋﺎم أو
te  ﻻ،ﻻ
اﻟﻌﺎم
ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﺪي
ﺧﻤﺴﺔ
ﻋﺸﺮة
اﺛﻨﻴﻦ
أﻧﻮي
ﺧﻄﻂ ﻣﺤﺪدة
أﻋﻮام
أﻋﻮام
اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
ﺑﻌﺪ
0
1
4
0
3
5
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0

Response Response
Percent
Count

12.0%
1.9%
2.8%

8
1
3

0

9

15

1

11

16

48.1%
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2

16

13

2

11

12

51.9%

44

0

1

2

1

4

15

21.3%

8

answered question
skipped question

Approximately 67% of those with immediate or extended family members
abroad intend to migrate as well. Of those who have family and/or friends abroad,
slightly more than 2/3 intend to go to the same countries where their networks reside.
Approximately half of those following their network intend to go to North America,
while the remainder is split fairly evenly between Europe and the Arab states, with
only one respondent listing Australia as a destination where he intends to join
Egyptian emigrants.
The vast majority of potential emigrants from the graduating class of
engineers at CU seek information about their future countries of destination either
from family and friends (71.2%) or their own personal research, including internet
research (listed by 57.5% of respondents), general personal research (30.7%) and
consuming media-dispensed information (30.1%), or combination thereof. Only 5.5%
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of students surveyed listed the Egyptian government as one of their sources of
information, while twice that percentage resorted to information from their country of
destination’s embassy.
Having a network, consisting of family (30.4%) or friends (20.3%), in the host
country appears to be useful for those students who intend on emigrating, as students
listed these persons as ones who will help them migrate. 23.2% listed that they will
seek the help of a migration broker. The anticipated costs associated with migration
average at almost 26,000 EGP, with only 8.3% (those planning to leave within the
next five years) of students noting that they had begun saving for their departure from
Egypt with some even having surpassed the amount they anticipate to need. Cost
expectations vary widely extending from 2000 EGP to 150,000 EGP, although the
bulk of students expect a cost ranging between 10,000-30,000 EGP.
According to Zohry, historical reported costs of migration to Europe from
Egypt ranged from 5,000 EGP, as paid by about 13.7 percent of migrants, to 50,000
EGP, which was the cost for about 1.6 percent of migrants. These costs simply cover
facilitation expenses but do not cover the cost of transportation itself nor do they
include documentation fees. The average cost for this trajectory was calculated to be
15,890 EGP, with 70 percent of migrants having paid between 5,000 EGP and 40,000
EGP 57 .
In the current study sample, it is clear that not all the students responding with
an estimate of their projected migration costs have already researched the expenses as
evidenced by the very broad spectrum of estimates provided. Based on the informal
conversations surrounding the topic, the students listed estimates that accounted for a
57
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range of costs associated with migration. Some students evaluated that the cost of
migration was simply the cost of purchasing a ticket to their destination and rent costs
for the first couple of months, while others calculated the overall costs including these
and the costs of equivalence exams, among several other factors.It is quite interesting
that those who expect assistance from Relatives or Friends in their destination
country, and those seeking the assistance of a migration broker on average estimate
the cost within 3000 EGP of one another, and fall right around the overall average for
the estimates. Conversely, those with relatives in Egypt or non-Egyptian friends in the
destination country assisting them, estimate the cost of migration at nearly 12,000
EGP less than the average of the overall responses. This could perhaps indicate that
students guided, or assisted, by persons who might not have emigrated or who may
have emigrated at some point in the past may be obtaining a less than realistic
portrayal of emigration, not only financially but also socially in terms of what to
expect in the destination country.
Almost two thirds of the students surveyed listed that their immediate family
would assist them financially for their emigration, while about 10% also answered
that extended family would contribute, and almost one third said that no one would
assist them in meeting the financial needs of their migration decisions.
2.4 Why do they want to emigrate?
Figure 3 shows the reasons for the students’ emigration intentions, clearly
demonstrating that prime among the factors impacting intention to emigrate from
Egypt is the perception that monetary compensation of these skilled minds in Egypt
will not match what is attainable abroad, and this is further exacerbated by the reason
chosen by 27.3% of respondents that “No job opportunities in Egypt”. The “Other”
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category provided interesting answers as several students noted that respectful
treatment that they anticipate from people abroad is one reason they would like to
migrate. One student also mentioned “democracy and human rights problems”
specifically as his reason for wanting to emigrate, while several others noted that their
academic aspirations drew them to the option of emigration.
Figure 3 - Reasons for Emigration

Students who included sending money home as one of the main reasons to emigrate
were drawn from the middle income bracket and below, which coincides with the
higher propensity for students from these socio-economic brackets to plan to remit
even before their departure. The range of anticipated remittance transfers listed by the
students whose emigration was partially prompted by the desire to remit, spanned
from 15-45% of their salaries.
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Figure 4 - Reasons for Country of Destination

Figure 4 shows the high value the students place on the increased job opportunities
they anticipate finding upon placing themselves on the international job market,
which nearly 54% of students list as a main draw to their target destination country.
The push and pull factors seem to highlight economic success, educational
opportunities and environmental woes as the primary reasons students aim to seek
work, or permanent residence, abroad. These factors must therefore be addressed in
policies seeking to address the needs of would-be emigrants to, if for no other reason,
ensure that dissatisfaction with their home country does not deter them from remitting
if they plan to do so, or from returning, even temporarily, to provide their sending
state with knowledge based capital gains, comprising both social and human capital,
as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
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3. SKILLED EMIGRATION
3.1 Effect/Cost of Skilled Migration
The emigration of highly educated nationals is one trend that is often said to
have potential drawbacks for the sending countries. The brain drain phenomenon is
believed to deprive the country of origin of its brightest minds, thereby utilizing the
sending country’s best trained capital for the benefit of the receiving country leaving
the country of origin to depend on their unskilled workforce as their engine for
growth, and curtailing development in the home country 58 .
The emigration of skilled Egyptian workers to the United States can be taken
as an example of this phenomenon. If we consider that real public expenditure in 1998
in Egypt per student equaled about 338 USD for primary education, 527 USD for
secondary education and 3337 USD for tertiary education 59 , we can calculate that the
expense to the state of producing one engineer in 1998 was approximately 20,970
USD 60 . This total cost in 2009 prices equals approximately 27,811 USD 61 . For the
receiving state, on the other hand, gains from the emigration of these trained minds
are sizable. In 1971-2, the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimated profits of
20,000 USD annually from each qualified emigrant from developing countries. In
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1979, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) listed
the market value of professional migrants aged 25-35 from Africa at 184,000 USD 62 .
Adjusting for inflation, the range given by these estimations would equate to gains
between 103,000 – 548,000 USD for the United States as a host county in current
prices.
Further depleting sending country national budgets, the expatriation of skilled
minds from developing countries often necessitates a replacement of the departing
domestic expertise with international expertise 63 . It is estimated, by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) “that the recourse to
international experts costs developing countries almost 40 per cent of the public
development aid they receive annually.” 64 Yet, while the direct cost to the sending
country, in terms of lost investment and knowledge replacement, does add up to a
considerable amount, the effect of skilled labor force emigration differs tremendously
depending on the home country situation, occupation and receiving country
demands 65 .
One striking fact is that the tertiary educated migrants are a small portion of
the overall migrant population—especially in large sending countries such as
Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. For example, between 10-15% of
migrants have tertiary education in Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria as
of year 2000. On the other hand, more than 50% of migrants to OECD
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countries from other countries, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and
Jordan have tertiary education. 66
In a study on migration to Kuwait, emigrants from capital-poor Arab countries were
found to be drawn “from the technical, skilled, and semiskilled sectors of society”.
Emigrants coming from Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq were found
in positions in Kuwait that required secondary or post-secondary training 67 . Migrants
from the Persian Gulf countries, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon take on positions
requiring high levels of education in the OECD. In terms of positions in the receiving
country, migrants from the Middle East and North Africa rank better than their Latin
American counterparts and worse than Asian migrants, with 56% of Turkish migrants,
47% of Tunisian migrants and 43% of Egyptian migrants obtaining skilled jobs and
comparable levels in the remainder of the region’s countries 68 . These differences are
key to note as such demands for specific skill sets will set the tone for future
emigration patterns to the European Union, and other regions where demographic
trends indicate future industry and labor supply gaps. These labor need projections
can benefit states with excess labor force, albeit not through direct employment in the
home country, by encouraging the excess supply of labor to be productive members of
other states or regions.
In purely economic terms, emigration is used to rectify market imbalances and
wage differentials currently existing globally. As of 2005, 12.9 million people, or
4.2% of the MENA population, had emigrated out of the region with most (52.2%)
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heading to the OECD countries 69 . Trusting in the invisible hand of the market,
emigration is easily justifiable as a counter-balance to the divergent capital, labor and
income realities visible in the world market 70 . Incorporating demographic projections
of the Middle East to this idea of the invisible hand further illustrates the necessity of
forethought in emigration policies. According to UNDP’s population projections for
the Middle East and North Africa, the region’s population will grow from 284 million
in 2000 to 410 million inhabitants in 2020. Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen will
experience the greatest growth rates, while the largest populations will be in Egypt,
with 91 million, Algeria and Morocco with 41 million inhabitants each, Yemen with
37 million and Saudi Arabia with 33 million 71 . These growth rates if not coupled with
equally expedient job creation will inevitably lead to a repeat of the high
unemployment rates witnessed in much of the Middle East in the 1990s “ranging from
8% in Saudi Arabia, 15% in Tunisia, and as high as 22% and 28% in Morocco and
Algeria” 72 .
Such demographic changes therefore will necessitate global cooperation to
absorb demand for market positions in settings where infrastructure and job provision
has yet to catch up. Regional alleviation of these market pressures for the Maghreb
and Mashrek seems the least plausible option, while international market absorption
would be most logical given, for example, the European Union’s growing demand for
labor and “dwindling population and labourforce” 73 . Even with the existing labor
dynamics, Kuwait, Syria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia hope to reduce their rates of
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emigration, with the latter two taking measures to encourage the return of their
migrants 74 . In 2001, Egypt’s official view on migration saw immigration levels as
adequate but hoped to lower them, and emigration levels as too low aiming to raise
them 75 . This policy decision is particularly noteworthy when compared with the
projected labor force growth, as Syria and Saudi Arabia—two states that would like to
lower their rates of emigration—will experience a comparable labor growth rate to
that of Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, whose response is to encourage emigration of their
nationals. Yet, even with state policies to encourage or discourage their nationals’
migration patterns, the determining factor of whether emigration will serve to
alleviate overcrowding of the labor force in source countries will inevitably be based
on the training and qualifications demanded by the receiving states.
3.2 Impact of Skilled Emigration on Domestic Unemployment
Similarly, on a domestic level, mismatched distribution of skills and education
to domestic market needs muddies unemployment projections as even sound
emigration policy aimed at alleviating labor surplus in specific industries would leave
behind a country with other industries scrambling to fill its positions with qualified
persons. Egypt, for example, finds its brightest minds drawn to the prestige of
particular careers, such as medicine and engineering, leaving emerging industries that
have yet to garner comparable levels of recognition and esteem to fend for
themselves 76 . In the current study sample, 87.2% of students noted that they would
only accept engineering positions abroad, which is in keeping with their career
projections for themselves following graduation as most students listed that they plan
to join the workforce as an engineer with only a very small amount listing other
74

Ibid.
Mghari, "Exodus of Skilled Labour: Magnitude, Determinants and Impacts on Development."
76
Sherelle Jacobs, "Coming to Grips with Egypt's Unemployment Crisis," Daily News Egypt, August
23 2009.
75

43

positions. However, as new entrants into the Egyptian labor market, these youth face
the added challenge of the disproportional representation of their age group in
unemployment statistics. The total unemployment for persons aged 15-29 in 1988 was
82%, which grew to 84% in 1998 with most of these being first-time job seekers 77 .
This particular sub-sample also faces the added complication of the high
concentration of unemployed persons within the educated segments of society, with
the highest concentration of unemployed persons (55%) being composed of those
with intermediate education 78 , followed by university educated persons who
constitute 14% of unemployment totals 79 . This counter-intuitive hindrance to
successful market absorption further exemplifies the discord between the products of
the educational system in Egypt and the needs of the market in the country.
Figure 5 - Unemployment Projections for Egypt 2006-2011 80
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According to United Nations projections, Egypt’s population is expected to
grow to 96 million in 2026, and 114.8 million by 2065, when it is expected to
stabilize 81 . The current population growth rate is approximately 1.4 million people per
year, and with such rapid growth come high levels of unemployment. Official
unemployment estimates show a drop from 9.2 percent unemployment in Egypt in
1991-1992, to about 8.4 percent in 2000-2001, although independent estimates place
the latter at around 14 percent 82 . In 2005, official estimates placed unemployment
between 10 and 12 percent, while the independent assessment’s figure doubled this
estimate 83 . In order to fully address these rates of unemployment, “Egypt will need to
achieve a sustained real GDP growth rate of at least 6 percent per year. The economy
has to generate between 600,000 and 800,000 new jobs each year in order to absorb
new entrants into the labour force” 84 . For the period extending from 2001-2010, the
labor supply in Egypt is predicted to grow at 2.6%, during which time “the average
number of new job seekers will increase to 638,000 per year” 85 . However, contrary to
what is needed, only about 370,000 new jobs were created each year from 1990 to
1997 86 , increasing slightly to 435,000 the following decade 87 , and Egypt’s real
economic growth has declined from 5% to 2.1% per annum 88 . As seen in Figure 5,
even the most optimistic growth projections for Egypt’s GDP, although it exceeds the
6% thought to be needed in 2003, would not provide for the growing demands of the
labor force for market absorption.
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3.2.1 Calculations: How The Migration Intentions of This Graduating Class can
Affect Unemployment
This section will aim to quantify the problem of market absorption by utilizing
published data on unemployment, annual engineering graduate numbers and the
proportion of the labor market made up of skilled workers. This data will be used to
estimate the numbers of positions available in the market for new entrants into the
field of engineering and observe these in light of the migration intentions indicated by
the current research sample. From there these calculations will quantify proposed
means of addressing unemployment, both by specifying needed increases in labor
market position provision and by assessing whether policies aimed at fostering and
encouraging the migration intentions of the current class in future graduating classes
would be beneficial.
These calculations are the researcher’s own and are listed here step by step to
elucidate the intention behind each calculation. Remainders are kept throughout the
steps to ensure that the final predictions of numbers needed to address unemployment
in Egypt are not over- or under-valued.
Step 1: Calculate unemployment in the field of engineering based on estimation of
unemployment assuming neutral growth rate 89 :
Unemployment = 2,345,091 90
If university educated persons account for 14% of unemployment 91
then, university unemployment = 0.14 x (2,345,091)
≈ 328,313
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If engineers account for 6% of all higher education in labor force 92
then, engineering unemployment = 0.6 x (328,312.74)
= 19,698.7644
Therefore, engineering unemployment in 2011 ≈ 19,699
Step 2: Calculate number of engineers in labor force calculations for 2011
Assuming neutral growth rate:
Labor force = 25,285,205 93
If university educated persons account for 12% of labor force 94
then, university educated labor force = 0.12 x (25,285,205)
≈ 3,034,225
If engineers account for 6% of higher education in labor force
then, engineers in labor force = 0.6 x (3,034,224.6)
= 182,053.476
Therefore, engineers in labor force in 2011 ≈ 182,053
Step 3: Calculate unemployment level within the field of engineering
If engineering unemployment in 2011 ≈ 19,699 95
and engineers in labor force in 2011 ≈ 182,053 96
then, 2011 engineers have 10.8% unemployment
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Step 4: Calculate the number of engineering graduates per year
Using the same number of students of engineering in the public universities as that for
2002/2003 97 : 104,081
then, graduating students ≈ (104,081) / 5 (years of study)
= 20,816.2
Therefore, overall graduating class of engineers in Egypt ≈ 20,816
Step 5: Calculate unemployment for class of new entrants into the field of engineering
If unemployment level for new entrants into the market was proportional to that for
the field of engineering overall
then, ideal unemployment for graduating class = 0.108 x (20,816.2)
≈ 2,248
In reality however, the proportion of new students among unemployed is 82% due to
the problem in Egypt of youth insertion in the market 98
Therefore, if engineering unemployment in 2011 is ≈ 19,699
then, actual unemployment for entrants in 2011 = 0.82 x (19,698.7644)
= 16,152.987
Actual unemployment for new entrants in 2011 ≈ 16,153
Step 6: Calculate jobs created per year for new entrants into engineering
If new jobs created per year = 435,000
then, new jobs for university educated persons = 0.12 x (435,000)
= 52,200
Of these, 6% are for engineers in work force = 0.6 x (52,200)
= 3,132
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Therefore, new jobs created per year for engineering = 3,132
Step 7: Check the numbers
Therefore, total accounted for = 16,152.987 + 3,132
≈ 19,285
Total unaccounted for = 20,816.2 – 19,284.987
≈ 1,531 engineers (≈ 7.36%)
Step 8: Calculate new jobs that would need to be created per year to yield
unemployment for new entrants that is proportional to that for the field of engineering
overall
If we wanted unemployment for new entrants to reflect that for engineers
then, new jobs per year for engineers would need to = 20,816.2 – 2,248.1496
≈ 18,568
Therefore, engineering new jobs for university educated persons
= (18,568.0504) / 0.6
≈ 309,468
Therefore, new jobs created per year would need to be = (309,467.51) / 0.12
≈ 2,578,896
Step 9: Apply results for study to overall graduating class of engineers in Egypt
If we apply the migration intentions for work (77.5%) to the projected number of
engineering graduates from public universities for 2011 in Egypt, we can visualize the
effect migration could have on unemployment in Egypt.

Applying results from question of interest in temporary work migration:
Engineering graduates leaving for work = 0.775 x (20,816.2)
≈ 16,133
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Engineering graduates remaining in Egypt

= 20,816.2 (100% - 77.5%)
= .225 (20,816.2)
≈ 4684

Therefore, unemployed engineers remaining, based on these students migration
intentions

= 4683.6 – 3132
≈ 1551

Therefore, unemployment rate for new entrants into the field of engineering in Egypt
following the migration of 77.5% of these new entrants as projected by the students’
intentions, would be:
= (1551.6 / 4683.6) x 100
= 31.128%
Step 10: Calculate projections of changes needed to attain desired levels of
unemployment
While the above rate of unemployment that would result from the anticipated
rate of migration of the students surveyed (31.128%) is significantly better than the
82% currently seen for new entrants in unemployment statistics, it is still a
worthwhile endeavor to calculate the rates of emigration that would be necessary,
based on current predictions of market provision of positions for new entrants into the
field of engineering (calculated here to be 3132), in order to have unemployment rates
for new entrants be proportional to those of the field overall and in order to achieve
0% unemployment.

If goal is 10.8% unemployment for new graduates
then, unemployed

= 4683.6 x (.108)
≈ 506
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then, necessary number of jobs for new entrants would be
4683.6 – 505.8288 ≈ 4178
This means that either job provision/creation would need to increase by
4177.7712 – 3132

= 1045.7712
= 33.39% increase

OR, emigration would need to increase by
≈ 1046 persons emigrating
Therefore, total engineering graduates needing to leave for work
= 16,132.555 + 1045.7712
= 17178.326 or 17179 engineering graduates
Therefore, necessary emigration rate to achieve 10.8% unemployment
for new graduates based on current market provision of positions
= 100 x (17178.326 / 20,816.2)
= 82.52%
This indicates that an increase of 5.02% is needed from current
migration intentions among new entrants
If goal is 0% unemployment
then job provision needs to increase by
4483.6 – 3132 ≈ 1552
= 49.54% increase
OR, emigration would need to increase by
≈ 1552 persons emigrating
Therefore, total engineering graduates needing to leave for work
= 16,132.555 + 1551.6
= 17,684.155 or 17,685 engineering graduates
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Therefore, necessary emigration rate to achieve 0% unemployment for
new graduates based on current market provision of positions
= 100 x (17684.155 / 20,816.2)
= 84.95%
This indicates that an increase of 7.45% is needed from current
migration intentions among new entrants

It is important to point out that, based on these results, the student intentions
seem to indicate a reasonable level of awareness, meaning that their migration
intentions meet the realities of the local labor market they are entering. The fact that
the intentions of near-graduates do show such an overwhelming desire to work abroad
and the more striking fact that these intentions might in fact be what is ideal under the
present market conditions in Egypt clearly indicates that the domestic environment is
not conducive to alleviating traditional fears of losses from skilled emigration. This
may, however, be a blessing in disguise for Egypt in the short-run as the domestic
market appears incapable of absorbing the skilled persons stretching the demand for
unavailable positions.
In 2006, the average male graduate from engineering faculties in Egypt took
approximately two years to find gainful employment, with about 50% needing this
amount of time, and an additional 25% found employment within the first five years
following graduation. These numbers have improved from their levels in 1998 when
50% employment rates for the class was reached three years after graduation and 75%
took nearly eight years to attain. For women, the remarkably low rate of incorporation
into the market has remained constant with less than 25% of female students joining
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the workforce even after 15 years 99 . The disjointed reality of education and
employment in Egypt is further exemplified by the non-existence of graduate
assistance for employment at public universities across the country. Even in private
universities, only two offer career services for their students and alumni 100 . This
signals the presence of the additional hurdle for students who are approaching a
difficult market with no sense of what limited options it has to offer.
The IMIS project discussed above is one model that could be adopted
nationally, bilaterally or multilaterally, as a way of connecting the prospective
applicant pool with positions needing their qualifications. Not only would such a
method aid in the amelioration of the perpetually increasing unemployment rate for
nationals with tertiary education, it would also facilitate the creation and retention of
ties with recent graduates for the Egyptian government. Domestically, by becoming
the portal through which recent graduates are placed in private or public sphere
positions, the Egyptian government will more easily be able to track trends in
graduate employment and market demand. This information can then be used to better
prepare university students for the real market and not an idealized version of what it
might provide.
Internationally, by facilitating coordination between its own nationals and
foreign states, the government can preemptively protect its nationals from the dangers
of illegal forms of migration (which only 10% of the present sample said they might
consider) as well as strengthen the accuracy of its own data on and ties with its
diaspora. Furthermore, by ensuring that it keeps in contact with its nationals abroad,
the Egyptian government will have a better understanding of the skills its nationals
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are acquiring abroad, and will consequently be better prepared for the imminent return
of a large majority of these immigrants.
The next chapter will consider some of the gains often discussed in the
literature on emigration, all of which would be strengthened by increased ties with
and support from the Egyptian government. The chapter will address remittances as
one benefit stemming from the emigrants while abroad, and follow with possible
gains arising from return migration.
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4. IS EGYPT FACING A NET GAIN OR NET LOSS?
4.1 Remittances
The stability of remittances, as will be discussed, has proven to be reliable in
the MENA region, but how far-reaching the effects of the remittances themselves will
be in terms of contribution to development once in the migrant sending country
largely depends on the situation in the home country 101 .
The economic environments that encourage out-migration also limit the
potential for migrant remittances to stimulate development in migrant sending
areas. Poor market infrastructure, particularly in rural areas from which many
migrants come, discourages the production of goods for markets. Incomplete
or missing credit markets in migrant sending areas make it difficult to harness
remittances for local investment, and they force migrant households to
perform the dual function of being agents both of migration and of
investment. 102

Low incomes, productivity levels and domestic policies yielding high inflation, risk
and economic uncertainty further hinders the potential gains that could come from
emigrants’ remittance sending patterns 103 . Domestic government policy in the migrant
sending states, which will be discussed below, thereby carries much of the obligation
to rectify its own policies to most effectively be able to harness the productive
potential of this significant source of income.
One aspect of economic development that is often said to be greatly influenced
by emigrant remittances, is income inequality in the migrant sending country and on
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the global level. Looking nationally first, remittances are said to increase income
inequality in the sending area thereby creating a self-perpetuating cycle where
deprived households will continue to send members abroad hoping to obtain the
remittance income from their emigration104 . The effect felt within the sending country
can vary, but is particularly interesting in the case of Egypt whose Gini coefficient
rises by 24.5% when remittances are factored into calculations of per capita
household income, meaning that income inequality increases dramatically when
remittances are included. Richard Adams explains that this occurs due to the
distribution of which quintile of society is producing and maintaining the largest
number of migrants abroad. He states that the poorest quintile in Egyptian rural
society is producing a proportional amount of migrants, but that the wealthiest 40% of
the population is producing a disproportionately large number of migrants, while the
middle strata are under-producing migrants. This means that the upper 40% is
receiving remittances from a larger amount of people, which he claims is where the
difference lies between the social strata, and not in the migrants’ earnings abroad or in
their likelihood to remit 105 . While clearly a legitimate concern, this macro level look
at the effect of emigrant remittances on the population can also be considered in a
different light.
After instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international migration,
and controlling for level of income, income inequality and geographic region,
results for the poverty headcount measure suggest that, on average, a 10%
increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population will
lead to a 2.1% decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per
person per day. After instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of
international remittances, a similar 10% increase in per capita official
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international remittances will lead, on average, to a 3.5% decline in the share
of people living in poverty. 106
Picturing population income shifts in this manner would illustrate that while the gap
between social strata has been exacerbated, the common denominator is now in a
higher place indicating an overall increase in the income levels of the population as a
whole.
On a global scale however, emigration is notably assumed to lead toward a
convergence of income and wages between capital-rich and capital-poor countries 107 .
In turn, “well-functioning markets for capital, credit, insurance, and futures emerge”
lessening the desire of nationals to emigrate. Once these institutions become wellestablished the state becomes incorporated as a developed capitalist state in the global
economy. This process, which has traditionally taken approximately eight or nine
decades to complete, may be more accelerated in recent years generating changes in
the country’s migration patterns enabling it to now be a net-importer of labor rather
than a net-exporter 108 .
4.1.1 Historically
Oftentimes, brain “mobility bolsters a developing country’s ability to attract
global investment and trade linkages” 109 . Countries in the MENA region, including
Egypt, Jordan and Turkey continue to utilize emigration as part of their economic
strategies 110 .
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The Egyptian government experimented with a range of policies to exploit this
resource but with little success. From 1964 Egyptians were allowed to hold
foreign currency accounts in Egyptian banks and were initially obliged to
repatriate a proportion of their income: 25% for single people, 10% for those
with families. This proved unsuccessful and exchange rates were altered in
1968 and 1972 in an attempt to encourage remittances. By the end of the
1970s, the government had begun to issue bonds for Egyptians abroad as a
way to tap their income for development investment. None of these policies
led to significant growth of access to remittances by official sources.
Fluctuations in remittances clearly relate to the unpredictable nature of
movements which are disruptive for migrants and make it very difficult to plan
based on future remittance transfers. 111
While such a strategy could potentially be viewed as risky, the reliance of
countries in the region on remittances sent back as part of their economic strategy has
notably proven to be sustainable and secure source of finance, even in times of
economic hardship for the host countries 112 . Comparing the statistics from the mid1990s to current remittance data demonstrates the stability surprisingly stemming
from this voluntary form of economic assistance.
In 1995, Egypt received $4.7 billion in remittances, nearly equaling the $6
billion in combined revenues brought in by oil exports, tourism and Suez Canal
receipts 113 . The previous year Egypt was one of the top five remittance receiving
countries that accounted for approximately one third of global remittances 114 .
In the fiscal year 2003–2004 the remittances of Egyptian expatriates amounted
to $2.999 billion. The US ranked top among the countries from which
Egyptians abroad send their remittances with $1.111 billion. Saudi Arabia
ranked second with $951 million, followed by the United Arab Emirates with
$278 million, and Germany with $131 million. 115
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Present day data shows the MENA region as the third largest recipient of
remittances globally, receiving 18% of global remittances 116 . In 2007, the MENA
region received approximately $28.5 billion in remittances, with Egypt leading the list
of recipients with $ 5.9 billion received 117 . Patterns of remittance by state of origin
differ, yet have shown to also be consistent over time. Moroccans have been found to
remit proportionally irrespective of their host state. Egyptians on the other hand,
“remit massively from the USA, Gulf states and Europe; and proportionately very
little from Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Canada and Greece” 118 .
Yet, despite seemingly permanent stays in the host country, one explanation
given for these continued remittances is the “return illusion” 119 that keeps emigrants
tied to their home countries despite the slim likelihood that they will return home.
By sending members abroad to work, households diversify their labor
portfolios to control risks stemming from unemployment, crop failures, or
commodity price fluctuations. Engaging in foreign labor also permits
households to accumulate cash for large consumer purchases or productive
investments, or to build up savings for retirement. Whereas the rational actor
posited by neoclassical economics takes advantage of a geographic
disequilibrium in labor markets to move abroad permanently to achieve higher
lifetime earnings, the rational actor assumed by the new economics of labor
migration seeks to cope with market failures by moving overseas temporarily
to repatriate earnings in the form of regular remittances or lump-sum
transfers. 120
Most sending and host countries view the circular migration trend as positive as long
as the length of time that the emigrant remained outside his or her own borders was
sufficient to offset the costs of his or her departure. If the migrant were to stay for a
short period of time abroad, one benefit to the sending state would arise from limiting
116

United Nations Development Program, "The Potential Role of Remittances in Achieving the
Millenium Development Goals--an Exploration," UNDP Background Note (2005).
117
Dilip Ratha, "Middle East and North Africa."
118
Baldwin-Edwards, "Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean."
119
Glystos, "International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain: A Study of 24 Labor-Exporting
Countries."
120
Massey, "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State."

59

the social cost of having a missing member in the nuclear family, yet such a decision
to return too promptly would exaggerate the proportional cost of the decision to
migrate. However, the desire to return promptly is an indication of the strength of the
ties remaining with the sending state, thereby translating into more secure remittance
sending patterns 121 .
Once received, remittances contribute to the local economies of the home
countries both at the micro and macro levels. In his study, Adams found that simply
receiving remittances increased the propensity of a family to invest 122 . While direct
evidence of remittance expenditure patterns is hard to find for the Middle East,
evidence suggests that the funds for this region are allocated comparably to those
received in the Mediterranean and Mexican cases. The latter regions utilize the funds
coming from remittances largely on consumption, namely “improved food, clothing,
housing and household effects. The economic impact of such spending varies from
country to country, but in general only the last two kinds of spending seem to be of
the labor-intensive employment-generating type” 123 . Data on remittance sending to
Morocco, Algeria and Egypt indicates the same spending pattern on consumption,
while highlighting that in the Egyptian case the propensity to consume is no higher in
remittance receiving families than it is in non-migrant-sending families 124 . Spending
on consumer goods for the remittance receiving families may seem like a shortsighted decision, but given the often difficult saving infrastructure and the need for
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immediate enhancement of a family’s standard of living, such decision are, at the
micro level, immediately logical and should be anticipated 125 .
That is not to say however that spending on consumption goods negates the
benefits of remittances on the larger national economy of the migrant sending state.
Most directly, consumption goods, especially those pertaining to housing, food,
education and health care, have the immediate effect of enhancing productivity in the
migrant sending state. The extent to which such increased productivity will have a
lasting impact largely depends on the structure of the remittance receiving state 126 .
Increased consumption will also have a multiplier effect in the economy as the
increased demand for goods and services will reinvigorate local business and generate
new demand for local manufactured goods 127 , providing that the remittances are not
used to increase imports 128 . More indirectly, remittances received in the migrant
sending states from their emigrants aid at the macro-economic level by alleviating
exchange constraints that are often faced by developing countries, providing sending
state nationals with access to foreign currency and bolstering domestic savings
through those families who despite any infrastructural obstacles are still able to
save 129 . Migrant sending households often also experience positive effects on income
as the steady flow of remittances provides them with risk-free access to capital
encouraging them to make economic contributions to local production that were
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previously unattainable. Regular market interaction would then further extend the
reach of the remittances to non-migrant sending households 130 .
4.1.2 Remittance Intentions for this Sample Set
While emigrant remittances have been shown to enhance standard of living
and positively influence demand for local market goods, the true developmental
impact can only be assessed when balanced against the loss experienced due to the
emigration of the migrant 131 . In order to make such an assessment, many of the
factors discussed above would need to be taken into account. In states where the labor
supply exceeds the labor demand in a particular sector, the emigration of a national in
that particular field, whether skilled or unskilled, would serve the development
purposes of the migration sending state. This is in large part due to the lack of
productive contribution this national would have otherwise made if they had not
emigrated. While this national may have contributed to the local economy as a
consumer, by emigrating and then remitting this now-emigrant is able to maintain his
or her level of consumption spending, via their home network’s use of the funds
remitted on consumption goods, while also likely being able to contribute more to the
national economy through the potential savings arising from the remaining unused
remittances.
In states however where the emigrant was able to work, the opportunity cost of
their departure must be calculated in terms of their current and projected productive
and economic contribution in their line of work. This must then be compared to the
emigrant’s current and projected earnings abroad, and the anticipated percentage as a
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portion of (potentially increasing) compensation that he or she expects to remit. Based
on this remittance amount, the economic contribution in consumption and in
productive investment of the remittance receiving household should be estimated.
This last step would likely prove to be the most challenging as intended spending
patterns may over-emphasize the productive use of the funds remitted while
downplaying the receiving household’s intended expenditure on consumption goods.
However, comparable real expenditure patterns could be scrutinized to determine how
far the remittance receiving household’s intentions are from what tends to occur in
reality. The final assessment of the economic contribution arising from remittances
sent by the emigrant can then be compared to what his or her productive contribution
to the labor market would have been had he or she stayed thereby determining
whether this particular migrant’s decision to leave was beneficial or detrimental to the
economic development of the sending state.
Applying this logic to the target sample of students for this survey aids in the
analysis of their anticipated remittance patterns. When asked what they expect their
salaries to be following graduation, student responses ranged from 800 EGP/month to
10,000 EGP/month. The average salary expectation was 2,530 EGP/month, while the
median answer was 2000 EGP/month, and the most listed salary expectation was
3000 EGP/month, followed closely by 2000 EGP/month. A marked difference arises
when these results are compared for male and female respondents, as the female
respondents anticipate salaries that are on average 500 EGP/month lower than those
projected by the male students for their work in Egypt. Female students’ expectations
average around 2,120 EGP/month and do not exceed 3000 EGP/month. There is also
a noticeable difference in salary expectations depending on the student’s familial
income level, as students from the highest income bracket expect almost twice as
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much on average as those from the <1000 bracket, while students in the middle
income brackets expect to earn amounts that hover right around the overall average of
responses.
When asked the same question in terms of expectations if they were to work
abroad, students listed salaries ranging from 2000 EGP/month on the lower end to
55,000 EGP/month on the higher. The mode in the students’ listing of salary ranges
abroad was 10,000 EGP/month, with an average of 12,540.70 EGP/month. Here again
we find that there is a clear difference in the expectations of male and female students,
with an average difference of almost 3000 EGP/month where female students project
salaries abroad to range from 3000-30,000 EGP/month, with less than a third of
female respondents listing salary expectation abroad higher than 6000 EGP/month.
77.3% of respondents who intend to work abroad or emigrate said that they
intend to remit part of their salary. Persons who reported that their household income
fell below 3000 EGP/month were 20% more likely to have the intention to remit than
persons whose income exceeded this amount, however the percentages of students
from all income brackets aiming to remit some portion of their income is notably
high. Of these a quarter were unsure of how much they intended to remit, with some
specifying simply that they will use what they need and send the remainder home,
while the remaining 75% specified amounts ranging from 10 to 90 per cent of their
wages, with the average falling just under 34%. Of the women who plan to remit, only
one specified a percentage of her salary (35%) while the rest said they did not know.
Based on their salary expectations, we can calculate what the potential
imagined remittance amount from this graduation class will be. If the 77.3% who plan
to remit while abroad, whose average expectation for compensation while abroad was
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12,540 EGP/month, do in fact do so, their total remittances would equal 291,788.175
EGP/month (53,530.2741 USD/month 132 ) 133 . The amount remitted is therefore
slightly higher than the sum of the salary expectations the students listed for work in
Egypt if they were to remain which add up to 263,155 EGP/month (48,277.35
USD/month). The difference between the sum remitted and the sum earned at home
will widen even further as the latter amount decreases as the engineer, or family unit,
utilizes this income for their livelihoods, as compared to the remittances which
represent a net amount that was dispensable and which can be used in the full by the
recipients.
Interestingly, in the responses from CU females, none noted sending money
home as part of the reason they intend to emigrate. This further plays into the country
context of this emigration decision as Egypt predominantly sends its single young
men abroad, while a woman emigrating is less likely to be the primary breadwinner
for any family unit and more likely to be married, therefore she will be less likely to
remit as she will be traveling as part of the family unit.
4.2 Gains from Return Migration
4.2.1 Skills acquired
Another criticism that arises when considering the region’s dependence on
remittances for economic stimulus addresses migrants from the Middle East who do
return to their country of origin. Oftentimes they return overseas after finding that
they are unable to maintain the lifestyle to which they have become accustomed
132
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following the depletion of their savings 134 . This cyclical pattern of movement, while
seemingly detrimental to the sending states, can serve the latter by curbing the effect
of lower remittance sending generally associated with skilled migrants 135 by
harnessing their presence in their home country in the form of information sharing.
This in turn raises the labor force’s proficiency via technology, methods or training
that may not have otherwise been available in the migrant sending country.
[A] recent study (Moomaw et. al, 1999) found that when physical and human
capital is taken separately to measure the influence on growth, the results [for
the aggregate Knowledge Economy Index and the GDP per capita] are
positive, but not statistically significant. However, when all the forms of
capital (physical, human, and knowledge) are included, the results are positive
and significant. Specifically, the output elasticity of this broader concept of
capital when considered within a Cobb-Douglas framework is 0.485. This
means that a change of 1% in capital results in an increase of 0.485% in the
level of economic output. 136
Using a revisionist approach to looking at migration, the prospect of skilled
demand and future employment abroad for higher wages and better conditions is also
said to serve as an incentive for nationals in the sending state to strive for higher
levels of education. In turn, if migration trends do not call upon all of the newly
educated nationals of the sending country to work abroad, the sending state’s resulting
levels of education are increased and the home country benefits even without having
taken into account the remittance patterns of those who have left or their potential
return home 137 . In a study of a representative global sample of 33 countries, Adams
found that less than 10 percent of those with tertiary education in sending countries
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migrated to the United States or the OECD countries 138 . One study found that
increased demand for migrants with tertiary education will lead to an increase in
secondary school enrollment, thereby enhancing interest in education in the sending
country 139 . Additionally, the circular nature of migration means that fears of brain
drain should be more accurately considered brain mobility 140 , whereby a migrant’s
knowledge is in reality being shared by both the host country, where the migrant is
likely refining the skills and bolstering his or her human capital, and the home country
to which a migrant might choose to return, even temporarily, sharing some of the
newly acquired skills and lessons with co-nationals in the sending state. This therefore
would indicate, that while a “brain” might not immediately and directly contribute to
productivity domestically if it migrates, the mobile nature inherent to circular
migration results in this “drain” not constituting a net loss for the sending state as
frequent access by the sending state to the human and social capital accrued enables it
to share in the same “brain’s” capacities.
4.2.2 Job Market
While the direct impact of skilled migrants’ return into the Egyptian job
market must be considered in terms of increased skill level and capabilities of the
market to absorb and benefit from these new levels, return emigration generates a
different type of stimulus for the home market as well. In analyses done by Barry
McCormick and Jackline Wahba on return migrants in the Egyptian market, results
showed that skill acquisition was not the only added benefit to be reaped from
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returnees. Levels of savings, coupled with the human capital brought back, impacted
entrepreneurship among returnees, as did region of origin. Since we clearly cannot
predict the propensity to save while abroad of the surveyed students for this study,
area of origin and interest in entering into public or private work will be applied to the
trends found by McCormick and Wahba to attempt to predict the potential market
contributions of these students. The current sample is composed primarily of urban
students, with the vast majority (nearly 90%) having been raised in urban Egypt and
intending to live in urban areas if they remain in Egypt. This would mean that nearly
30.6% of this study’s total sample may return to Egypt without savings as “36% of
rural-origin and 30% of urban-origin returnees were unable to make any savings at
all” 141 . Savings on their own however will not influence the sample population’s
likelihood of investment quite as much as it might other broader populations as
educated returnees are influenced by both savings and human capital acquisition 142 .
Keeping savings constant, returnees who spent a longer period of time abroad (an
average of 4.3 years as compared to 2.4 years) and noted that they have acquired
useful skills during their time abroad are much more likely to invest in non-farm
enterprises 143 . According to the predictions of students sampled for this study, nearly
half of those who intend to return to Egypt after some time abroad intend to do so
after having spent more than 4 years abroad, which might indicate a high likelihood
(nearly 45%) that students from this graduating class will contribute to Egypt’s
economy via entrepreneurial projects.
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The share of returnees’ enterprises engaged in services activities is twice that
of stayers. On the other hand, non-migrants’ enterprises tend to be
concentrated in trade activities. The proportion of returnees’ enterprises in
manufacturing is about the same as that of non-migrants: 28% compared to
26%. 144
In general, returnees found to invest in non-farm enterprises have been found
to have higher levels of education than those investing in agricultural projects, yet the
majority of such projects are founded in rural areas 145 . Therefore, in this sample
population it would be interesting to find out upon their return, whether the migrants
with higher levels of education who do choose to return to rural areas opt to invest in
agricultural or non-farm enterprises.
Furthermore, there is a shift in the market distribution of returnees among the
private and public sectors following their migration. Slightly less than a third of those
employed in the public sector prior to migration return to public enterprise, with one
third entering into private sector employment 146 . Employment characteristics within
each sector also change as there is a 9% increase, from 10% to 19%, in the number of
employers among the sample population post-migration. This increase is felt most in
urban settings where the share quadruples, as compared to the 50% increase
experienced in rural areas 147 . As employers, returnees generally account for 15
percent of the capital invested in a small enterprise, thereby also being responsible for
generating 15% of the associated employment, equaling approximately 1.5 more jobs
per enterprise than do stayers generate 148 . While returnees are just as likely to employ
informal workers who do not pay into social security, the overall quality of the jobs
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created by returnees, both for formal and informal employees, is deemed higher in
terms of allowing for paid leave, for example. Although returnees do utilize the
informal labor market for their employee pool, 76% of returnee firms follow proper
procedure and pay taxes on their earnings and 80% have licensed or registered their
enterprise, as compared to 67% and 74% of stayer firms respectively 149 .
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5. STEPS FORWARD
Without simply reducing each student, potential migrant or not, to an
economic unit and acknowledging that beyond purely monetary evaluations, there are
social and political reasons to choose emigration, the following is a discussion of
policies that can be used by sending states to better harness gains that could stem from
their citizens’ migration choices..
5.1 Existing Policies on Emigration
The state’s influence on the impact and potential productivity generated from
emigration, both in terms of promoting higher education and training and in relation
to the possible economic contributions arising from migrant remittances, has been
discussed in the preceding chapters. Without the proper reinforcement and enabling
infrastructure in the home country, it would be practically impossible for emigration
to have far-reaching positive effects. It would likely still influence household level
changes in educational desires and standard of living, but it would be a waste for
migrant sending countries’ governments not to implement necessary methods, some
of which will be discussed in this chapter, to maximize the gains accessible from their
existing emigration patterns.
Egypt’s strategy as a sending country to promote emigration that was noted
earlier is utilized “as part of broader strategies to acquire foreign exchange, reduce
unemployment, and develop skills” 150 . Egyptian Emigration Law no. 111, discussed
earlier, has put forth regulations to attempt to further harness the potential
developmental gains that could arise from the large sums being remitted back into
150
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Egypt every year. Since remittance income constitutes approximately 21 percent of
foreign investment within Egypt 151 , the law aims to address infrastructural fears that
may lead migrant families to shy away from investing within the country. The law
notes migrant rights to sponsorship and grants exemptions from taxes and fees on the
returns earned by emigrants on their deposits in Egyptian banks. Furthermore,
“migrants’ capital utilized in investment projects in Egypt is to be granted the same
advantages granted to foreign capital 152 . Other sending states aim to slow the
integration of their nationals in the host country so as to ensure continued remittances
without needing to rely on encouraging emigration of their nationals 153 . Based on the
remittance intentions for the class in question for this study, the Egyptian government
would benefit greatly from strengthening ties with migrants prior to their departure
and facilitating the flows of funds from this diaspora to their country of origin.
Furthermore, if one is to assume that the migration intentions of future classes of
graduates from Egyptian universities will exhibit the same trends as the sample class,
then the government would not stand to benefit from slowing the integration of their
nationals abroad as, based on the intentions identified in this study, intentions to
emigrate prevail among recent graduates thereby meaning that Egypt will have a
replenishing source of remitting migrants.
5.2 Domestic Policy Discussion
Just as the movement of labor internationally is guided by foreign demand and
domestic surplus, the incongruity evident within the Egyptian labor market and its
unemployment patterns can be rectified through re-adjustment of skills based on
domestic needs assessments. Egyptian Minister of Manpower and Emigration
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recommends the use of vocational training centers and post undergraduate reeducation as tools to stimulate the reallocation of labor force resources
domestically 154 . According to the International Labour Organization,
Skills development should be understood as one of the elements of the
virtuous circle, within which we have high wages, high productivity, and high
development. Identifying the virtuous circle as the target, or end goal, the
policies enacted in its pursuit serve 3 main objectives:
• Matching supply and demand of skills, and to expand availability of
training to more people so that they can benefit from economic growth
• Maintaining the employment of workers through re-skilling and
lifelong learning
• Building up capabilities to sustain a dynamic development process,
using education and training policies to boost technological change,
investment, diversification and competitiveness. 155
The government has begun promoting these much needed market shifts by
simultaneously addressing two potential hindrances to attaining its goals. The first is
the cultural undercurrent that fuels the desire to ‘save face’ and gain prestige by
working within certain industries, such as medicine, pharmacy and engineering,
which the government is targeting through its “Train Campaign,” a campaign working
to promote the idea that it does not matter where one graduated from, it matters that
one is employed 156 . This campaign also aims to educated people and train them to
enter into positions in the private sector. Ironically, in this sample population, 67.3%
of the students noted that they preferred to work in private companies, while 31%
would work in either public or private companies. The second obstacle to market
labor force re-allocation is the need for training conducive to effective reorganization.
“The government sponsored Social Development Fund has invested in over 700 new
trade trainees to retrain the Egyptian labor force; upgraded 152 vocational trading
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centers; and produced 38 new curricula” 157 . The SDF also invests in capacity building
through micro-credit programs for small and medium size enterprises, to encourage
informal enterprises to enter into the formal economy 158 .
In addition to skill development and increased investment spending, Egypt can
benefit from catering to international market demands in ways beyond emigration by
meeting foreign demands through domestic services. The Egyptian Minister of
Communications and Technology proposes the “Development of Export Oriented IT”
by which he intends to cater to foreign needs through the creation of Egypt as a
resource pool and base for outsourcing activities needed by companies around the
world. In this way, he foresees attracting ICT investment and foreign direct
investment, which in turn will assist in achieving the ministry’s set goals of sustaining
an annual growth rate of 20% and increasing job provision in this particular sector by
about 20,000 in three years 159 . This would contribute a perceptible increase in the
number of positions for new entrants into the labor market each year, particularly if
foreign states necessitate outsourced support rooted in technology, as this would mean
that the employable “export oriented” persons would need to be pulled from
engineering graduates, and this would in effect double the provision of positions for
these graduates each year. Linking the IT industry domestically with international
needs would also facilitate knowledge sharing and technology exchange 160 .
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5.3 International Policy Discussion
5.3.1 Promoting Circular Migration
The presence of a strong diaspora in certain receiving states can serve as a
lobby for migrant interests and home country interests on a global scale. A strong
diaspora can also implement more formal methods, such as that noted above, of
information sharing to enhance collaboration between their two homes in science and
technology, and diffuse new strategies used in trade and management 161 . These types
of policies however, being spurred by the diaspora would prove to be largely
inefficient if the home country’s government does not put an equal stake in advancing
its own technology to efficiently be able to implement incoming shared knowledge 162 .
The IOM advocates the notion of circular migration for the dissemination of
professional skills and methods. This type of migration pattern enables the sending
country to harness the professional productive abilities of its diaspora while
alleviating fears holding the migrants back from returning to their home countries
associated with working conditions and standard of living. Advocating the use of
circular migration enables persons originating from one country to return to this
country, whether through a state-sponsored program or on their own, for a short
period of time during which they can teach or apply their lessons learned while abroad
in their home country. This option is particularly enticing for migrants who do not
feel that their home country offers a professional environment that they are willing to
reenter, but who still wish to contribute to the its advancement. In order to
successfully utilize circular migration for the benefit of both the sending and receiving
countries, both governments must implement certain practices.
161
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These include, for receiving countries: visa regimes, student fee levels,
networking with sending countries, and ethical and controlled recruitment
campaigns. For sending countries, taxation and human rights problems are
clear disincentives, and R&D priorities, incentives not only to return but also
to attract expatriate investments, along with other issues of economic growth
and development are essential. This approach is emphasised systematically in
the two UNDP Arab Human Development Reports, as well as the World Bank
regional employment report (World Bank, 2004a) and other IOM reports on
emigration and remittances. 163
Such circular migration would also be most useful in situations where the emigrant
has formed a family abroad as it would enable him or her to maintain some form of
stability in their new life while also keeping their ties with their home country strong.
Some sending governments in the hopes of promoting permanent repatriation,
have considered offering assistance programs as an incentive for their expatriate
nationals to return. These programs can be all-encompassing including offers
covering transportation costs of the emigrant, his or her family and their belongings.
Some also include transportation of any relevant equipment and insurance offers. Yet
despite some countries’ use of such extreme measures to lure nationals back in,
evidence has shown that these financial incentives take a back seat to the expatriates’
expectations of workable infrastructure. Additionally, they are often quite expensive
and inefficient at encouraging mass repatriation, and could cause problems between
the nationals and the returning expatriates who may be viewed as receiving unfair
privileges 164 . Despite the gains to the returning emigrants of accepting such incentive
packages, the use of circular migration still seems the more plausible option as it
provides the migrant sending country with the gains associated with brain mobility
while alleviating the pressure off the sending government to make such provisions
allowing the latter to then commit more of its resources to building the needed

163
164

Baldwin-Edwards, "Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean."
Ouaked, "Transatlantic Roundtable on High-Skilled Migration and Sending Countries Issues."

76

technological infrastructure that would enable the country to best utilize the new
shared knowledge.
5.3.2 Harnessing Remittance Flows
The proposed support for circular migration additionally allows the emigrant
to maintain strong ties with their sending state, and therefore by encouraging circular
migration and providing the economic atmosphere to harness its gains, emigrants will
be more likely to continue to remit. Migrant sending government policy should
directly address remittances and seek assistance from the international community to
reduce the high costs associated with sending remittances. Such global policies would
not only encourage increased remittance sending and alleviate the taxing effect that
the current high costs create, but it would also encourage the use of formal remittance
channels which in turn would aid the global community in understanding the true
effect of emigrant remittances on the home country 165 .
Facilitating the use of formal channels through which funds can be remitted
will also enable sending governments to securitize the remittances, or, in other words,
to utilize the guarantee of consistent future money flows, based on the historical flows
they can now monitor, to “extend loans by the local banks for productive purposes,
[and to] pass on interest savings from the remittance securitization to its customers
and offer longer term loans on new products” 166 . Enhanced access to banking and the
formalization of remittance flows is a key goal of several international organizations,
including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, who hope such
measures will alleviate poverty and ameliorate access to financial services for people
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in poor areas of developing countries. A benefit of securitizing these remittances
would be the ability to more accurately quantify the direct effect monies remitted
have on household investment decisions and long-term economic adjustment within
the country. By keeping closer track of the investment patterns of migrant families
before and after the migration of one of their members, the home country government
can better understand what the immediate needs of families are based on how they
spend their additional funds, and can begin to provide channels for nationally
constructive uses of these supplementary funds.
Prime among the means found to formalize remittances is the establishment,
or strengthening, of migrant-sending countries’ economic policies by establishing an
effective banking system and an appropriate exchange rate 167 . Simultaneously,
reducing the cost of access to formal remittance networks, including banks and other
transfer systems, would likely be a more expedient and efficient method of
formalization than any attempt to formalize all available informal routes.
Reducing formal remittance costs, in turn, can be accomplished with
regulatory changes such as: (1) allowing and encouraging domestic banks to
operate in countries where migrants are employed to overcome migrant
distrust of banks and ensure that banking services are provided in the migrants'
language (in some cases, capital requirements need to be reduced for transfer
agents as well); (2) discouraging or banning exclusive arrangements between
transfer agents such as Western Union or Moneygram and entities with
dispersed facilities in migrant areas of origin such as postal agencies, thus
ensuring competition in the so-called "last mile" of a remittance corridor; and
(3) encouraging the spread of cell-telephone based remittance transfer
systems, since this promises the lowest cost and remitters and remittance
receivers can use the cell telephones for other purposes as well. 168
This latter method of reducing costs has been proven effective in several other sectors
by extending access to information systems to remote areas without requiring the
heavy investment in infrastructure that was previously necessary. In February 2007,
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Mastercard in conjunction with the GSM Association proposed a plan that would send
money from one SIM card to another via Mastercard’s transaction networks to
facilitate the use of cellular technology in remittance sending 169 . With only one-third
of the world’s population having easy access to banking services and 2.5 billion
phones being used around the world 170 , if the idea to leverage this technology for use
in formalizing remittances did catch on, better estimates of remittance patterns could
be formulated and the true impact of remittances on their recipients could begin to be
analyzed.
5.3.3 Consider the Option of Taxation
Whether migration constitutes a net brain drain for the sending country or a
brain gain for the receiving country blurs an already unclear line between rights of the
migrant sending and migrant receiving state over a migrant’s labor, knowledge and
wealth. The topic of taxation, although fairly uniformly applied as a right of the
country of residence, deserves further scrutiny as it falls squarely within the gray area
of mixed state possession. “Until the early seventies, Egyptians working abroad were
obliged to transfer to Egypt in a free currency a certain proportion (normally 25
percent) of their incomes” 171 , yet, and despite the growth of the numbers of Egyptians
heading to Arab states for work in that decade, the practice is no longer utilized
meaning that there exists in the Egyptian diaspora a large portion of Egyptians who do
not pay taxes anywhere.
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On the polar extreme, the threat of dual taxation 172 for citizens of one state,
residing in and perhaps becoming citizens of, another is what complicates the
applicability of policies regarding the taxation of emigrants. These migrants’ situation
places them in a position where they may show allegiance to two countries
simultaneously, for example by paying taxes in their host country while maintaining
political ties in the other.
[P]rofessional migrants retain their national status and associated rights,
including often the right to vote, but carry no corresponding tax obligation, even
of a minimal nature. The situation is one of “representation without taxation.”
The anomaly is particularly compounded because typically these highly skilled
migrants are among the more prosperous and successful even prior to their
migration, and their ability to work abroad renders them the more taxable, and
almost totally untaxed, citizens of their countries. When one considers that in
Albert Hirchman’s apt conceptualization, these migrants have chosen to “exit”
but have retained “voice” and “loyalty,” it appears legitimate to regard their
escaping the tax system as altogether incongruous. (Bhagwati, 1979 [1983, pp
63-64]). 173
The source country thereby not only loses individuals who may have been able to
contribute quite productively within their home country, but it has also allowed them
to maintain the same rights afforded to any of their citizens 174 . In effect, the taxation
scheme as it exists in most countries does not distinguish between persons emigrating
and persons traveling for a short period in the rights they can access upon their return
to their home country. The United States is one of the few states, and is the only
advanced country, to apply a tax on its emigrant population that has surpassed a
certain wage cap abroad. The justification for such taxation by the United States of its
172
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citizens would seem to address precisely the dilemma underscored by Bhagwati’s
concern over “representation without taxation,” in that the U.S. bases its taxation
scheme on citizenship rather than residence 175 . In this way, it is able to tax its citizens
around the world for the benefits they reap by carrying this citizenship, in lieu of
holding them only accountable when within the state borders.
While this is a logical approach, if applied incorrectly taxation based on
citizenship and not residence could lead to the creation for a call for double taxation.
Several fears arise however from such a call. Nonresident citizens give up some of
their claims to services that only home-based nationals can access, such as roads,
healthcare services and public education, yet they also may need to access resources
that would be of no use to persons within their own territory. Citizen migrants
maintain the right to access personal protection, property protection, right to vote and
the right to enter. They also might have benefited in the past from state resources that
will now not provide gains for the state that provided them. One example that arises
here is the use of public schooling by a citizen preceding their departure from the
country. Would it be justifiable for the state to factor in its expenditure on education
for the 34.2% of our present sample who attended a public primary school, and/or the
40.5% and 58.4% who did so for their preparatory and secondary years respectively to
calculate taxes owed? Could the state also attach a value to its expenditure on private
schooling?
If the idea of taxation is based on what the state believes it is owed, then the
room for abuse of taxation by malintentioned states would be too high for this
recommendation to work. Conversely, qualifying state collection of nonresident
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citizens’ taxes with exceptions to ensure that precautions are taken, by all countries, to
circumvent the issues of double taxation, by accounting for differences in each
migrant’s situation in terms of how much they would have paid in taxes in their host
country, how much they are currently paying and how much the cost of living will
enable them to pay, would likely serve to lessen apprehension regarding the
imposition of the tax 176 , although this process would prove cumbersome and
ineffective if not coordinated through an international body to ensure synchronicity
across all host and destination countries. The United Nations General Assembly, in its
meeting to discuss “High-level international intergovernmental consideration for
financing development” in 2001, did recommend emigrant taxation and emphasized
the need for an International Tax Organization to lead monitoring and coordination of
taxation, as one way to provide some redress for the sending countries 177 .
Another suggestion put forth to avoid criticism for double taxation is to word
regulations mandating an emigrant income tax in a way that allows for migrants to
renounce their citizenship if the terms are not acceptable to them 178 . Having seen that
91% of students intend to return to Egypt following a short period of time abroad, it
would be hard to imagine that a renunciation of their Egyptian citizenship would be a
path of interest. This ultimatum, while clearly a direct challenge to the home
country’s government to utilize the funds from taxes received in an acceptable manner
for fear of losing its ties to the Egyptian diaspora, might not be very effective in this
situation as the renunciation of home in itself does not appear to be a plausible option
for migrants from Egypt who would likely not use such a measure to hold their
government accountable for the direction the tax monies collected travel.
176
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The idea that a state would benefit through taxation from the loss of many of
its most talented minds seems flawed since the internal development that is desired
through the generation of this additional source of income could stagnate when faced
with infrastructure that has not caught up with what is needed to properly utilize
incoming funds. Therefore this policy recommendation cannot be used independently,
but must be coupled with a diversified approach that will bolster infrastructural needs
in Egypt and also ensure that funds are funneled appropriately into projects and/or
areas where they are most needed and through which potential developmental, social
and economical, gains will be maximized.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The policy discussion here, it should be noted, considers emigration
retroactively and must be supplemented with systemic and societal changes that will
simultaneously address the existing trends in unemployment patterns in Egypt and
encourage the strengthening of ties among the diaspora, and between the Egyptian
diaspora and Egypt. For example, by working to harness remittance monies, or
highlighting the value added to the market by return migrants through their
contribution of skills and additional jobs in the market, Egypt is able to benefit from
the migration of its skilled minds; however, by merely aiming to benefit in retrospect
from the decision of its migrants, Egypt, as a sending state, is not sufficiently
scrutinizing the intention of its nationals to emigrate.
The research discussed here illustrates that the migration intentions in the student
population sampled is not negligible and, if it is found to be reflected beyond this
survey’s target population, could affect Egyptian population dynamics so fundamentally
as to alter the demographic constitution of future generations, particularly if
disenchantment with the home state leads migrants to choose to remain abroad for longer
periods of time or even permanently. The guiding dynamics that lead to a student’s
decision to choose to migrate emerge even before the student is born as the societal
reinforcement of what a family’s desirable expectations for this new born should be
inevitably influence the manner in which the child is raised to think about education and
future opportunities.

That public higher education in Egypt is based primarily on matching the most
desired areas of study with the highest scoring high school graduates perpetuates a
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never-ending cycle whereby the highest scores are associated with only a limited
number of university degrees. Therefore, even if a high school graduate is not
interested in a particular field of study, if he/she earns a high score in the national
“thanaweya” (final high school) exams, it has become socially objectionable to forego
applying for these select few prestigious majors, namely medicine, engineering,
pharmacy and political sciences and economics, among others. This, in turn, generates
fresh graduates in particular fields whose scores on the national entrance exams were
disproportionately high as compared to other fields of study, as opposed to generating
graduates in each field with a proper bell curve representation including a portion of
the brightest high school students, a large majority of students who earned average
scores and a few who did not do as well. While such a bell curve might develop
among the university students themselves, it still could not be juxtaposed (when
considering the national high school exam scores) across different faculties to show
an even distribution of high schools’ brightest minds across disciplines of study at the
university level. Where the bell curve ends for one major of study might be where
another begins, meaning that the latter fields of study and, by extension, its dependent
industry is not set up for success from the very beginning. While one cannot make the
assumption that all those earning high scores are necessarily distributed among a few
top majors in the top universities, as some may not face or might be able to evade
pressures to conform, the current reality does dictate that all those in those top majors
at the top universities are high scorers since they all have to have met the minimum
acceptance scores. Rectifying such deeply seeded societal impressions of what is best
can only be possible if the issue is addressed from the top with education for the
general public about market realities and the harm that arises out of unwarranted
concentration in particular industries, as well as from the bottom with an educational
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system that promotes independent thought, which would enable students to recognize
where their interests truly converge and lead them to choose the proper field based on
this recognition.
The problem of socially dictated educational aspirations is compounded when
it is considered in light of the present research, as the concentration of the brightest
minds in a few particular areas of focus leads to the over-saturation of the market and
the creation of high levels of unemployment for graduates from these prestigious
faculties. Therefore, not only has the ‘prestige’ mentality led to disadvantaging full
industries, but it also then contributes to an amplification of the problems of
unemployment and skilled emigration.
One way of resolving some of the adverse effects of emigration is the “winwin strategy” proposed by Chouri (1997). This strategy recognizes individual
initiative in emigration and the government’s role as a facilitator of individual
initiative. However, the “win-win strategy” is a utopian situation in which all
parties in the game are expected to gain from the exchange. If the strategy
were to work, it would involve the regions or parties concerned seeking
maximization of employment opportunities for workers, skill enhancement
and other management strategies. And in cases where the maximum cannot be
achieved, the strategy holds ways of reducing the gap in such a way that there
would be mutual benefits for all parties. The strategy is, therefore, thoughtprovoking as a way of resolving the dilemma posed by ill-integrated
consequences that offer little or no gain to the source or destination regions. 179
Contemplating emigration with the aim of creating a win-win strategy is necessary
both domestically and internationally, as discussed earlier. Domestically, working to
balance skills with need is the clear first step. Domestic policy can also contribute in
win-win thinking in terms of recognizing the realities facing the country. As we
discussed that 82% of recent graduates find it impossible to enter into the market upon
graduation, and even after 5 years, only about 75% successfully do, domestic policies
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aimed specifically at those left to live in the lag between education and employment
would prove most efficient. If the migration intentions, for example, of recent
graduates are gauged and funneled into effective placements abroad for the first few
years following graduation, then the government of Egypt would benefit its own
country in the short-run by lessening the rates of unemployment, industry-wide and
for new entrants, and benefit from the ripple effects of human and social capital
accumulation, as discussed earlier, gained while abroad by the return migration of the
students after their set placements abroad. Realistically, the short-run implementation
of such a strategy would need serious consideration in terms of how best to
incorporate the returnees following their ‘training’ period abroad as the market may
be faced with the same overwhelming demands for entry a few years after the students
graduate. In the long-run however, this strategy may prove to be sustainable as the
conditions, both logistical and infrastructural, should be in place that will facilitate the
placement of students in positions in which expertise will be necessary upon their
return.
This strategy clearly would require international cooperation of the sort used
in the IMIS project discussed earlier to succeed and to best offer the opportunity for
all parties involved to ascertain the level at which mutual cooperation will best yield
the most valuable win-win situation. If assessed within existing views on international
migration, security concerns would weigh heavily against permitting emigration in
many industrialized countries 180 , and therefore, without first addressing such
concerns, a situation that might be a win for the receiving country may not
comprehensively constitute a win for the sending country. Efforts by the government
on the international front should strive to generate bilateral and multilateral
180
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agreements that would enable intending migrants from Egypt to find gaps within
foreign markets to fill, and that would encourage these foreign countries to turn to
Egypt first as needs emerge. In order to accomplish such a feat and confidently be
able to sell Egyptian graduates as the best candidates for open positions, the system of
higher education within Egypt should continue to expand its provision of accredited
schools and improve the level of tertiary education in existing universities to earn
accreditation and facilitate entrance into foreign job markets for its recent graduates.
While solely utilizing the Maghreb and Mashrek states to alleviate market woes in
Egypt was noted earlier to be the least plausible option, if the creation of an “Arab
Economic Citizenship Area,” 181 for example, were supplemented with agreements
with the European Union and any other states whose market supply needs
reinforcement, the situation could prove to be a definite win for Egypt, and ideally for
the host states as well.
6.1 Future Research
In order to determine whether the efforts the Egyptian government would need
to expend to secure agreements as recommended above would be worthwhile, this
study first needs to be expanded to provide a representative assessment of the
migration intentions of all students graduating from university across Egypt. This
would allow researchers to evaluate which industries are most likely to be affected by
emigration and which labor markets are most strained, in terms of either too many or
too few new entrants each year. Feasibility studies delving into labor market needs in
popular countries of destination and labor market generation in Egypt could also
benefit potential discussion to create mutually beneficial agreements as these would
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be based on realities of the market and not on illusions of possibilities from either
party.
Furthermore, future research would benefit from the perspectives of Egyptians
abroad across countries of destination and fields of employment to see whether their
intentions to remit and to return reflect the same patterns as the intentions of students
who plan to migrate. Research with nationals abroad could also gauge the realities of
expenses by country of destination and income; the reasons migrants would or would
not choose to return; and the strength of their relationship with the Egyptian
government so as to provide the home government with a basis from which to begin
its work to ameliorate its relationship with the diaspora.
In addition to cross-country, single-point-in-time studies of Egyptian migrants,
discussions with nationals abroad and domestically could provide the basis for an
interesting longitudinal study whereby not only are student intentions at a single point
in time compared with the realities experienced by their demographic counterparts
abroad at the same point in time. Their intentions could be tracked every few years for
several decades to determine whether the destination choices, financial costs and
gains, remittance patterns and duration of expatriation matched the intentions when
the subjects were students.
Further scrutiny of return migration would also benefit this field of study. A
contemporary study on the real activities of return migrants and any obstacles that
emerge in their attempts to return would benefit Egypt as a case study by enabling the
country to create policies based on realistic expectations of gains accrued from the
emigration of its nationals.
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH SURVEY
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY ANSWERS FOR CAIRO UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF
ENGINEERING CLASS OF 2010

Table 2 - Respondent Gender
Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Response
Percent

Answer Options

78.9%
21.1%
answered question
skipped question

Male ذآﺮ
Female أﻧﺜﻰ

Response
Count
90
24
114
1

Table 3 - Respondent Marital Status
Marital Status اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ
Response
Percent

Answer Options

99.1%
0.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
answered question
skipped question

Never Married ﻟﻢ ﻳﺴﺒﻖ ﻟﻚ اﻟﺰواج
Married ﻣﺘﺰوﺟﺔ/ﻣﺘﺰوج
Widowed أرﻣﻠﺔ/أرﻣﻞ
Divorced ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺔ/ﻣﻄﻠﻖ
Separated ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻠﺔ/ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻞ

Response
Count
113
1
0
0
0
114
1

Table 4 - Respondent Religion
Religious Affiliation اﻟﺪﻳﺎﻧﺔ
Response
Percent

Answer Options

88.6%
11.4%
0.0%
answered question
skipped question

Muslim ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺔ/ﻣﺴﻠﻢ
Christian ﻣﺴﻴﺤﻴﺔ/ﻣﺴﻴﺤﻲ
Other دﻳﺎﻧﺔ أﺧﺮى
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Response
Count
101
13
0
114
1

Table 5 - Other Citizenships
Do you have any other citizenships? هﻞ ﺗﺤﻤﻞ ﺟﻨﺴﻴﺎت أﺧﺮى؟
Response
Percent

Answer Options

2.7%
97.3%
answered question
skipped question

Yes ﻧﻌﻢ
No ﻻ

Response
Count
3
108
111
4

Table 6 - Pre-University Schooling
Pre-University Schooling اﻟﻤﺮاﺣﻞ اﻟﺪراﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ
Answer Options
Where did you attend primary school? اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻹﺑﺘﺪاﺋﻴﺔ
Where did you attend preparatory school? اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻹﻋﺪادﻳﺔ
Where did you attend secondary school? اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔ
answered question

Public
Private
School
School
ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ
38
73
45
66
66
47
113
skipped question

Response
Count
111
111
113
2

Table 7 - Languages Spoken
Which languages do you speak? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ هﻲ اﻟﻠﻐﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﺤﺪﺛﻬﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ
ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Response
Percent

Answer Options

99.1%
0.0%
95.6%
25.7%
8.8%
0.0%
0.9%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
answered question
skipped question

Arabic اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ
Chinese اﻟﺼﻴﻨﻴﺔ
English اﻹﻧﺠﻠﻴﺰﻳﺔ
French اﻟﻔﺮﻧﺴﻴﺔ
German اﻷﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Greek اﻟﻴﻮﻧﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Italian اﻹﻳﻄﺎﻟﻴﺔ
Japanese اﻟﻴﺒﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Spanish اﻷﺳﺒﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Other (please specify أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

110

Response
Count
112
0
108
29
10
0
1
0
0
0
113
2

Table 8 - Engineering Concentration
Which field of engineering are you studying? ﻣﺎهﻮ ﻓﺮع اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳﺔ اﻟﺬي ﺗﺪرﺳﻪ؟
Answer Options
Architectural اﻟﻤﻌﻤﺎرﻳﺔ
Civil اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ
Electrical اﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﺔ
Mechanical اﻟﻤﻴﻜﺎﻧﻴﻜﻴﺔ
Computer اﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ
Chemical اﻟﻜﻴﻤﺎﺋﻴﺔ
Petroleum اﻟﺒﺘﺮول
Aerospace اﻟﻄﻴﺮان
Biomedical اﻟﻄﺒﻴﺔ
Please specify your concentration رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺘﺨﺼﺺ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

19.1%
10.9%
29.1%
26.4%
3.6%
3.6%
0.9%
0.0%
6.4%

21
12
32
29
4
4
1
0
7
44
110
5

answered question
skipped question

Table 9 - Household Income
What is the total monthly income in your household in LE? ﻣﺎ هﻮ ﻣﺠﻤﻮع اﻟﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺸﻬﺮي ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﻞ
إﻗﺎﻣﺘﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي؟
Response
Percent

Answer Options

18.8%
31.7%
30.7%
8.9%
9.9%
answered question
skipped question

< 1000
1000-3000
3000-7000
7000-12000
> 12000

Response
Count
19
32
31
9
10
101
14

Table 10 - Employment Status
Do you currently work? هﻞ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﺎ؟
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify your current position ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ
اﻟﻮﻇﻴﻔﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

95.6%

108

4.4%

5

answered question
skipped question

111

113
2

Table 11 - Current Means of Financial Support
How do you currently support yourself? (Check all that apply) آﻴﻒ ﺗﻌﻮل ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Answer Options

Male ذآﺮ

Female أﻧﺜﻰ

4
86
11
1
0

0
24
0
0
0

Work ﻋﻤﻞ
Family Support دﻋﻢ أﺳﺮي
Savings ﻣﺪﺧﺮات
Scholarship ﻣﻨﺤﺔ دراﺳﻴﺔ
Other (please specify أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

3.6%
98.2%
9.8%
0.9%
0.0%
answered question
skipped question

4
110
11
1
0
112
2

Table 12 - Means of Financial Support Following Graduation by Gender
How will you support yourself following graduation? (Check all that apply) آﻴﻒ ﺗﻨﻮي إﻋﺎﻟﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺑﻌﺪ
اﻟﺘﺨﺮج ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Answer Options

Male ذآﺮ

Female أﻧﺜﻰ

88
5
8
1

24
0
1
0

Work ﻋﻤﻞ
Family Support دﻋﻢ أﺳﺮي
Savings ﻣﺪﺧﺮات
Other (please specify إﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

100.0%
4.5%
8.0%
0.9%
answered question
skipped question

112
5
9
1
112
2

Table 13 - Means of Financial Support Following Graduation by Income Bracket
How will you support yourself following graduation? (Check all that apply)
آﻴﻒ ﺗﻨﻮي إﻋﺎﻟﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﺨﺮج ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
What is the total monthly income in your
household in LE? ﻣﺎ هﻮ ﻣﺠﻤﻮع اﻟﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺸﻬﺮي ﻓﻲ
ﻣﺤﻞ إﻗﺎﻣﺘﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي؟
1000- 3000- 7000Response
Answer Options
< 1000
> 12000
3000
7000
12000
Percent
Work ﻋﻤﻞ
Family Support دﻋﻢ أﺳﺮي
Savings ﻣﺪﺧﺮات
Other (please specify إﺧﺮى
)رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Response
Count

14
0
0

26
0
0

23
1
5

9
1
1

7
3
0

100.0%
6.3%
7.6%

79
5
6

0

0

1

0

0

1.3%

1

answered question
skipped question

112

79
1

Table 14 - Private or Public Employment Desired
Do you intend to work for a public or private company? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺮآﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ام ﺧﺎﺻﺔ؟
Response
Percent

Answer Options

Response
Count

1.8%
67.3%
31.0%
answered question
skipped question

Public ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
Private ﺧﺎﺻﺔ
Either Private or Public أي ﻧﻮع

2
76
35
113
2

Table 15 - Previous Employment Outside Egypt
Have you ever worked outside Egypt before? هﻞ ﺳﺒﻖ ﻟﻚ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ؟
Response
Percent

Answer Options

Response
Count

92.1%
7.9%
answered question
skipped question

No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify where ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﻜﺎن

105
9
114
1

Table 16 - Expected Domestic Compensation
How much would you expect to earn as an engineer in Egypt upon graduation? آﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻊ أن ﺗﻜﺴﺐ
آﻤﻬﻨﺪس ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﺨﺮج؟
Answer Options

Response
Average

Response
Total

Response
Count

Anticipated Salary in LE/month اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺐ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ
ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

2,530.34

263,155

104
104
11

answered question
skipped question

Table 17- Intention to Work Abroad in the Future by Gender
Do you intend to work abroad in the future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ؟
Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify where ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﻜﺎن

Male
ذآﺮ
9
77

113

Female
أﻧﺜﻰ

Response
Percent

16
22.7%
8
77.3%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
25
85
110
4

Table 18 - Offer of Employment Abroad
Do you already have an offer to work abroad? هﻞ ﻟﺪﻳﻚ ﻋﺮض ﻋﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ؟
Response
Percent

Answer Options

Response
Count

82.7%
17.3%
answered question
skipped question

No ﻻ
Yes ﻧﻌﻢ

91
19
110
5

Table 19 - Expected Compensation Abroad
How much would you expect to earn as an engineer abroad? آﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻊ أن ﺗﻜﺴﺐ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس
ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟
Answer Options

Response
Average

Response
Total

Response
Count

Expected Salary in LE/month اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺐ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ
ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

12,540.70

1,078,500

86
86
29

answered question
skipped question

Table 20 - Intention to Emigrate in the Future by Gender
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ؟
Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Answer Options
Yes, this year  ﺧﻼل هﺬا اﻟﻌﺎم،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, in 1-2 years  ﺧﻼل ﻋﺎم أو اﺛﻨﻴﻦ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, in 3-5 years  ﺧﻼل ﺛﻼﺛﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ أﻋﻮام،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, in 6-10 years  ﺧﻼل ﺳﺘﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻋﻮام،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, but I don’t have concrete plans yet ،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﺪي ﺧﻄﻂ ﻣﺤﺪدة ﺑﻌﺪ
No, I do not intend to emigrate  ﻻ أﻧﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة،ﻻ

Male
ذآﺮ

Female
أﻧﺜﻰ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

2
18
25
3

0
1
1
0

1.8%
17.4%
23.9%
2.8%

2
19
26
3

14

5

17.4%

19

23

17
36.7%
answered question
skipped question

114

40
109
5

Table 21 - Intention to Return Following Time Abroad
If you intend to work abroad or to emigrate, do you intend to return to Egypt
permanently after some time abroad?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻮدة إﻟﻰ ﻣﺼﺮ،إذا آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج أو اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
ﺑﻌﺪ ﻗﻀﺎء ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟
Response
Response
Answer Options
Percent
Count
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify how long you expect to stay abroad
ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﺪة اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﻗﻀﺎءهﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج

9.3%

9

90.7%

88
97
18

answered question
skipped question

Table 22 - Intention to Return Following Time Abroad by Expected Departure Timeframe
If you intend to work abroad or to emigrate, do you intend to return to Egypt permanently after
some time abroad?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻮدة إﻟﻰ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻗﻀﺎء ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟،إذا آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج أو اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the
future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ؟
Yes, but
Yes, in
Yes,
Yes,
Yes, in
I don’t
6-10
this
in 1-2
3-5
have
years
year
years
years
concrete
Response Response
،ﻧﻌﻢ
Answer Options
،ﻧﻌﻢ
،ﻧﻌﻢ
 ﺧﻼل،ﻧﻌﻢ
plans
Percent
Count
ﺧﻼل
ﺧﻼل
ﺧﻼل
ﺛﻼﺛﺔ إﻟﻰ
yet ،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺳﺘﺔ إﻟﻰ
هﺬا
ﻋﺎم أو
ﺧﻤﺴﺔ
ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ
ﻋﺸﺮة
اﻟﻌﺎم
اﺛﻨﻴﻦ
أﻋﻮام
ﻟﺪي ﺧﻄﻂ
أﻋﻮام
ﻣﺤﺪدة ﺑﻌﺪ
0
3
4
0
1
11.9%
8
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify how long you
2
15
22
3
17
88.1%
59
expect to stay abroad ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء
ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﺪة اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﻗﻀﺎءهﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج
answered question
67
skipped question
3

Table 23 - Intention to Remit
If you plan to work abroad or emigrate, do you plan to send money back to Egypt
during your time abroad?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي إرﺳﺎل أﻣﻮاﻻ ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ،إذا آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج أو اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
أﺛﻨﺎء وﺟﻮدك ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟
Response
Response
Answer Options
Percent
Count
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify a percentage you plan to send back
home رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﻮي أرﺳﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ(ﻧﻌﻢ

22.7%

20

77.3%

68

answered question
skipped question

115

88
27

Table 24 - Intention to Remit by Income Bracket
If you plan to work abroad or emigrate, do you plan to send money back to Egypt during your time
abroad?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي إرﺳﺎل أﻣﻮاﻻ ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ أﺛﻨﺎء وﺟﻮدك ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟،إذا آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج أو اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
What is the total monthly income in
your household in LE? ﻣﺎ هﻮ ﻣﺠﻤﻮع
اﻟﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺸﻬﺮي ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﻞ إﻗﺎﻣﺘﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي؟
<
1000- 3000- 7000>
Response Response
Answer Options
1000 3000 7000 12000 12000 Percent
Count
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify a percentage you
plan to send back home ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ
اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﻮي أرﺳﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ

1

2

8

2

2

19.7%

15

9

22

18

6

6

80.3%

61

answered question
skipped question

Table 25 - Reasons for Emigration
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ هﻲ أهﻢ أﺳﺒﺎب
اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻟﺪﻳﻚ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Response
Percent

Answer Options

68.8%
To make a higher income ﻟﻜﺴﺐ دﺧﻞ أآﺒﺮ
10.4%
To send money home ﻹرﺳﺎل أﻣﻮال ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ
28.6%
To get training and return ﻟﻠﺘﺪرﻳﺐ ﺛﻢ اﻟﻌﻮدة
24.7%
To live outside Egypt ﻟﻠﻌﻴﺶ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
49.4%
Bad living conditions in Egypt ﻟﺴﻮء أﺣﻮال اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺸﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
To join family already outside Egypt ﻟﻠﺤﺎق ﺑﺎﻻهﻞ اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ
2.6%
ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
To escape from family pressures and troubles ﻟﻠﻬﺮوب ﻣﻦ
9.1%
ﺿﻐﻮط ﻋﺎﺋﻠﻴﺔ أو ﻣﺸﻜﻼت
There are no job opportunities in Egypt ﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﻮﻓﺮ ﻓﺮص ﻋﻤﻞ
27.3%
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
20.8%
Other (Please specify أﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ
answered question
skipped question

116

Response
Count
53
8
22
19
38
2
7
21
16
77
38

76
25

Table 26 - Reasons for Emigration by Gender
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ هﻲ أهﻢ أﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
ﻟﺪﻳﻚ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Answer Options

Male
ذآﺮ

Female
أﻧﺜﻰ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

50
8
19
17
32

3
0
3
2
5

69.7%
10.5%
28.9%
25.0%
48.7%

53
8
22
19
37

2

0

2.6%

2

6

1

9.2%

7

17

4

27.6%

21

To make a higher income ﻟﻜﺴﺐ دﺧﻞ أآﺒﺮ
To send money home ﻹرﺳﺎل أﻣﻮال ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ
To get training and return ﻟﻠﺘﺪرﻳﺐ ﺛﻢ اﻟﻌﻮدة
To live outside Egypt ﻟﻠﻌﻴﺶ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
Bad living conditions in Egypt ﻟﺴﻮء أﺣﻮال اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺸﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
To join family already outside Egypt ﻟﻠﺤﺎق ﺑﺎﻻهﻞ
اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
To escape from family pressures and troubles ﻟﻠﻬﺮوب ﻣﻦ
ﺿﻐﻮط ﻋﺎﺋﻠﻴﺔ أو ﻣﺸﻜﻼت
There are no job opportunities in Egypt ﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﻮﻓﺮ ﻓﺮص
ﻋﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Other (Please specify أﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

14

2
21.1%
answered question
skipped question

16
76
38

Table 27 - Reasons for Emigration by Income Bracket
What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ هﻲ أهﻢ أﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻟﺪﻳﻚ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ

Answer Options
To make a higher income ﻟﻜﺴﺐ دﺧﻞ أآﺒﺮ
To send money home ﻹرﺳﺎل أﻣﻮال ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ
To get training and return ﻟﻠﺘﺪرﻳﺐ ﺛﻢ اﻟﻌﻮدة
To live outside Egypt ﻟﻠﻌﻴﺶ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
Bad living conditions in Egypt ﻟﺴﻮء أﺣﻮال
اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺸﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
To join family already outside Egypt
ﻟﻠﺤﺎق ﺑﺎﻻهﻞ اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
To escape from family pressures and
troubles ﻟﻠﻬﺮوب ﻣﻦ ﺿﻐﻮط ﻋﺎﺋﻠﻴﺔ أو ﻣﺸﻜﻼت
There are no job opportunities in Egypt
ﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﻮﻓﺮ ﻓﺮص ﻋﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Other (Please specify أﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء
اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

What is the total monthly income in your
household in LE? ﻣﺎ هﻮ ﻣﺠﻤﻮع اﻟﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺸﻬﺮي ﻓﻲ
ﻣﺤﻞ إﻗﺎﻣﺘﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي؟
1000- 3000- 7000< 1000
> 12000
3000
7000 12000

Response
Percent

Response
Count

6
2
1
2

16
4
7
4

12
1
7
5

6
0
4
3

6
0
3
3

65.7%
10.0%
31.4%
24.3%

46
7
22
17

6

9

11

4

4

48.6%

34

0

0

0

0

2

2.9%

2

1

0

1

1

2

7.1%

5

2

5

8

2

2

27.1%

19

0

7

6

1

1

21.4%

15

answered question
skipped question
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70
31

Table 28 - Prior Knowledge of Emigrants
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply) هﻞ ﺗﻌﺮف أﻧﺎس
هﺎﺟﺮوا ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Yes, my parents  واﻟﺪﻳﺎ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, my brother  أﺧﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, my sister  أﺧﺘﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, a member of my extended family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد،ﻧﻌﻢ
أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺳﻌﺔ
Yes, a friend  ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﻟﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
No, I don't know anyone who has emigrated  ﻻ أﻋﺮف،ﻻ
أﺣﺪا هﺎﺟﺮ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

11.8%
1.8%
2.7%

13
2
3

49.1%

54

51.8%

57

20.9%

23
110
5

answered question
skipped question

Table 29 - Intent to Join Past Emigrants
If you know people who have already emigrated, are you planning on going to one of the
countries where they are?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﺬهﺎب إﻟﻰ إﺣﺪى اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ هﺎﺟﺮوا إﻟﻴﻬﺎ؟،إن آﻨﺖ ﺗﻌﺮف أﻧﺎس هﺎﺟﺮوا
Response
Percent

Answer Options

I do not know anyone who has emigrated already ﻻ أﻋﺮف
13.7%
أﺣﺪا هﺎﺟﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ
No, I do not plan to go to the same country  ﻻ أﻧﻮي اﻟﺬهﺎب،ﻻ
27.4%
إﻟﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ
Yes, I plan to go to the same country (Please specify the
58.9%
country/countries  أﻧﻮي اﻟﺬهﺎب إﻟﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ،ﻧﻌﻢ
اﻟﺪول/اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
10
20
43
73
42

Table 30 - Pull Factors
What draws you to your country of destination? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺠﺬﺑﻚ إﻟﻰ
اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
I have friends there ﻟﺪي أﺻﺪﻗﺎءهﻨﺎك
I have relatives there ﻟﺪي أﻗﺎرب هﻨﺎك
I have a job offer there ﻟﺪي ﻋﺮض ﻋﻤﻞ هﻨﺎك
I want to live in that country أﺣﺐ أن أﻋﻴﺶ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ
More job opportunities there ﻓﺮص اﻟﻌﻤﻞ أآﺜﺮ هﻨﺎك
My destination is less crowded and/or polluted وﺟﻬﺘﻲ أﻗﻞ
إزدﺣﺎﻣﺎ أو ﺗﻠﻮﺛﺎ
I could study there ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻨﻲ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ هﻨﺎك
Other (Please specify أﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ
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Response
Percent

Response
Count

10.5%
23.7%
18.4%
51.3%
53.9%

8
18
14
39
41

31.6%

24

43.4%
9.2%
answered question
skipped question

33
7
76
39

Table 31 - Source of Information about Destination
What is your source of information about your country of destination? (Check all that
apply) ﻣﺎهﻮ ﻣﺼﺪر ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﻚ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Response
Percent

Answer Options
Friends/Relatives أﻗﺎرب/أﺻﺪﻗﺎء
Internet اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ
Egyptian Authorities ﻣﺼﺎدر ﻣﺼﺮﻳﺔ رﺳﻤﻴﺔ
Personal Research ﺑﺤﺚ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ
Media (TV/Radio/Newspapers ﺟﺮاﺋﺪ/رادﻳﻮ/اﻹﻋﻼم )ﺗﻠﻔﺰﻳﻮن
Embassy of the Receiving Country ﺳﻔﺎرة اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺼﻮدة
Other (Please specify ﻣﺼﺎدر أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

71.2%
57.5%
5.5%
37.0%
30.1%
11.0%
4.1%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
52
42
4
27
22
8
3
73
42

Table 32 - Persons Assisting in Migration
Are there persons who will help you migrate? (Check all that apply) هﻞ هﻨﺎك ﻣﻦ ﺳﻴﺴﺎﻋﺪك
ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Relatives in your destination country أﻗﺎرب ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ
ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ
Relatives in Egypt أﻗﺎرب ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Egyptian Friends in your destination country أﺻﺪﻗﺎء
ﻣﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ
Non-Egyptian Friends in your destination country أﺻﺪﻗﺎء
ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ
Friends in Egypt أﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Migration Brokers وﺳﻄﺎء هﺠﺮة
Other (Please specify أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

30.4%

21

18.8%

13

20.3%

14

5.8%

4

8.7%
23.2%
17.4%
answered question
skipped question

6
16
12
69
46

Table 33 - Expected Cost of Migration
What do you expect is the cost of migrating? آﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻊ ان ﺗﻜﻮن ﺗﻜﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﻬﺠﺮة؟
Response
Average

Answer Options

Response
Total

25,641.30
1,179,500
answered question
skipped question

Expected cost in LE اﻟﺘﻜﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي
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Response
Count
46
46
69

Table 34 - Do you have Savings for Use in Migration
Have you saved up money to use for your emigration? هﻞ إدﺧﺮت أﻣﻮاﻻ ﺑﻘﺼﺪ اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة؟
Response
Percent

Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify in LE ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

91.7%
8.3%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
66
6
72
43

Table 35 - Other Means of Financial Assistance for Migration
Are there others financially assisting you in your emigration? (Check all that apply) هﻞ
هﻨﺎك ﻣﻦ ﻳﺴﺎﻋﺪك ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Response
Percent

Answer Options

Yes, a member of my immediate family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد،ﻧﻌﻢ
63.0%
أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮة
Yes, a member of my extended family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد،ﻧﻌﻢ
9.6%
أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺳﻌﺔ
1.4%
Yes, friend/friends أﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻟﻲ/ ﺻﺪﻳﻖ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, people from my neighborhood/village  أﺷﺨﺎص ﻣﻦ،ﻧﻌﻢ
0.0%
اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺔ/اﻟﺠﻴﺮة
32.9%
No, no one is assiting me financially  ﻻ أﺣﺪ ﻳﺴﺎﻋﺪﻧﻲ ﻣﺎدﻳﺎ،ﻻ
If yes (Please specify in LE اذا أﺟﺒﺖ ﺑﻨﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
46
7
1
0
24
1
73
42

Table 36 - Acceptable Positions Abroad
Do you intend to work as an engineer abroad, or will you accept a position in another
industry?  أم ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﻗﺒﻮل اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل ﺁﺧﺮ ؟،هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج
Response
Percent

Answer Options

87.2%
12.8%
answered question
skipped question

Engineering positions only وﻇﺎﺋﻒ هﻨﺪﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ
Any position abroad أي وﻇﻴﻔﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج
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Response
Count
68
10
78
37

Table 37 - Completion of Equivalence Exams
If you intend to work as an engineer, have you already completed any necessary
equivalence exams for your destination country?  هﻞ أﺟﺮﻳﺖ أي،إن آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس
إﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟
Response
Response
Answer Options
Percent
Count
Yes, I have already completed the exams  ﻟﻘﺪ أآﻤﻠﺖ،ﻧﻌﻢ
0.0%
0
اﻹﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ
9.9%
7
In progress اﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﺑﻬﺎ ﺟﺎري
74.6%
53
I will in the future ﺳﻮف أﺟﺮﻳﻬﺎ ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
8.5%
6
No, I do not intend to  ﻻ أﻧﻮي،ﻻ
No, none are needed in my country of destination  ﻟﻴﺴﺖ،ﻻ
7.0%
5
ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﻗﺼﺪهﺎ
answered question
71
skipped question
44

Table 38 - Completion of Equivalence Exams by Expected Departure Timeframe
If you intend to work as an engineer, have you already completed any necessary equivalence exams for
your
destination country?  هﻞ أﺟﺮﻳﺖ أي إﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟،إن آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the
future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ؟
Yes,
Yes, in Yes, in
but I
Yes,
Yes,
3-5
6-10
don’t
Answer Options
in 1-2
this
years
years
have
years
year
،ﻧﻌﻢ
،ﻧﻌﻢ
concret Response Respons
،ﻧﻌﻢ
Percent
e Count
،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺧﻼل
ﺧﻼل
e plans
ﺧﻼل
ﺧﻼل هﺬا
 ﺳﺘﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ إﻟﻰyet ،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﻋﺎم أو
اﻟﻌﺎم
ﺧﻤﺴﺔ
ﻋﺸﺮة
ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ
اﺛﻨﻴﻦ
أﻋﻮام
أﻋﻮام
ﻟﺪي ﺧﻄﻂ
ﻣﺤﺪدة ﺑﻌﺪ
Yes, I have already completed the
0
0
0
0
0
0.0%
0
exams  ﻟﻘﺪ أآﻤﻠﺖ اﻹﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ،ﻧﻌﻢ
0
1
4
1
0
10.2%
6
In progress اﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﺑﻬﺎ ﺟﺎري
2
14
16
2
12
78.0%
46
I will in the future ﺳﻮف أﺟﺮﻳﻬﺎ ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
0
1
1
0
1
5.1%
3
No, I do not intend to  ﻻ أﻧﻮي،ﻻ
No, none are needed in my
0
0
3
0
1
6.8%
4
country of destination  ﻟﻴﺴﺖ،ﻻ
ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﻗﺼﺪهﺎ
answered question
59
skipped question
11
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Table 39 - Prior Knowledge of Emigrants by Expected Departure Timeframe
Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply) هﻞ ﺗﻌﺮف أﻧﺎس هﺎﺟﺮوا ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ
ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future?
هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ؟
Yes,
but I
Yes,
don’t
Yes, in
No, I
Yes, in 3-5
have
6-10
do not
Yes,
in 1-2 years
concre
years
intend
this
years
،ﻧﻌﻢ
te
Response Response
،ﻧﻌﻢ
to
Answer Options
year
،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺧﻼل
plans
Percent
Count
ﺧﻼل
emigra
 ﺧﻼل،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺧﻼل
ﺛﻼﺛﺔ
yet ،ﻧﻌﻢ
ﺳﺘﺔ إﻟﻰ
te  ﻻ،ﻻ
هﺬا اﻟﻌﺎم
ﻋﺎم أو
إﻟﻰ
ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ
ﻋﺸﺮة
أﻧﻮي
اﺛﻨﻴﻦ
ﺧﻤﺴﺔ
ﻟﺪي
أﻋﻮام
اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
أﻋﻮام
ﺧﻄﻂ
ﻣﺤﺪدة
ﺑﻌﺪ
0
1
4
0
3
5
11.1%
8
Yes, my parents  واﻟﺪﻳﺎ،ﻧﻌﻢ
0
1
0
0
0
1
1.7%
1
Yes, my brother  أﺧﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
0
1
1
0
1
0
2.6%
3
Yes, my sister  أﺧﺘﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, a member of my
0
9
15
1
11
16
44.6%
36
extended family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ،ﻧﻌﻢ
أﻓﺮاد أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺳﻌﺔ
2
16
13
2
11
12
48.0%
44
Yes, a friend  ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﻟﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
No, I don't know anyone who
0
1
2
1
4
15
19.7%
8
has emigrated  ﻻ أﻋﺮف أﺣﺪا،ﻻ
هﺎﺟﺮ
answered question
108
skipped question
2

Table 40 - Willingness to Resort to Irregular Modes of Migration
How willing would you be to migrate illegally if a legal path to migration is unavailable?
ﻣﺎ ﻣﺪى إﺳﺘﻌﺪادك ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة ﺑﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ إذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻟﻚ ﻃﺮق ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ؟
Answer Options
Will definitely resort to illegal measures if a legal way is
not available ﺳﻮف أﻟﺠﺄ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺄآﻴﺪ إﻟﻰ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ إذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ
ﻃﺮق ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ
Very willing ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﺟﺪا
Somewhat willing ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺸﻲء
Very Reluctant ﻣﺘﺮدد ﺟﺪا
Will not resort to illegal measures if a legal path is not
available ﻟﻦ أﻟﺠﺄ إﻟﻰ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ إذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻃﺮق ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ

Response
Percent

Response
Count

0.0%

0

1.3%
3.9%
3.9%

1
3
3

90.9%

70

answered question
skipped question
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77
38

APPENDIX C: SURVEY ANSWERS FOR PRIMARY UNIVERSITIES SAMPLED
This Appendix provides the answers given to the survey questionnaire for the population of students reached from each of the primary
universities sampled to illustrate whether the same patterns found in the Cairo University students are reflected in the overall student/recent
graduate population, recognizing that this larger sample is not representative of the intentions of the overall student population at each of these
universities. The overall sample reached by the researcher consisted of 442 students and recent graduates from universities across Cairo in
addition to Alexandria University. Over half of the responses gathered were drawn from Cairo University, while another 15.8% came from Ain
Shams, 16.3% from the American University in Cairo and 12.1% from Alexandria University. The answers from these four universities are
given here, and account for 400 of the total number of responses.

Gender اﻟﺠﻨﺲ
Answer Options
Male ذآﺮ
Female أﻧﺜﻰ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

159
57

47
17

39
12

50
17

123

Response
Percent

74.1%
25.9%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
295
103
398
2

Marital Status اﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ
Answer Options
Never Married ﻟﻢ ﻳﺴﺒﻖ ﻟﻚ اﻟﺰواج
Married ﻣﺘﺰوﺟﺔ/ﻣﺘﺰوج
Widowed أرﻣﻠﺔ/أرﻣﻞ
Divorced ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺔ/ﻣﻄﻠﻖ
Separated ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻠﺔ/ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻞ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

204
11
0
0
1

60
3
0
0
0

50
1
0
0
0

57
10
0
0
0

Response
Percent

93.5%
6.3%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
371
25
0
0
1
397
3

Religious Affiliation اﻟﺪﻳﺎﻧﺔ
Answer Options
Muslim ﻣﺴﻠﻤﺔ/ﻣﺴﻠﻢ
Christian ﻣﺴﻴﺤﻴﺔ/ﻣﺴﻴﺤﻲ
Other دﻳﺎﻧﺔ أﺧﺮى

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

192
21
1

45
18
0

48
3
0

53
14
0

124

Response
Percent

85.6%
14.2%
0.3%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
338
56
1
395
5

What is the total monthly income in your household in LE? ﻣﺎ هﻮ ﻣﺠﻤﻮع اﻟﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺸﻬﺮي ﻓﻲ ﻣﺤﻞ إﻗﺎﻣﺘﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي؟
Answer Options
< 1000
1000-3000
3000-7000
7000-12000
> 12000

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

29
73
56
17
18

6
19
19
11
4

6
16
15
5
4

4
8
12
5
34

Response
Percent

12.5%
32.1%
28.3%
10.5%
16.6%
answered question
skipped question

Pre-University Schooling اﻟﻤﺮاﺣﻞ اﻟﺪراﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ
Answer Options
Where did you attend primary school? اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻹﺑﺘﺪاﺋﻴﺔ
Public School ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
Private School ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ
Where did you attend preparatory school? اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻹﻋﺪادﻳﺔ
Public School ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
Private School ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ
Where did you attend secondary school? اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔ
Public School ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
Private School ﻣﺪرﺳﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

Response
Count

66
140
206

20
42
62

15
35
50

4
63
67

385

82
124
206

26
36
62

28
22
50

6
60
66

384

120
94
214

32
32
64

37
14
51

125

12
55
67
answered question
skipped question

396
396
4

Response
Count
45
116
102
38
60
361
39

Do you have any other citizenships? هﻞ ﺗﺤﻤﻞ ﺟﻨﺴﻴﺎت أﺧﺮى؟
Answer Options
Yes ﻧﻌﻢ
No ﻻ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

Response
Percent

Response
Count

7
206

3
61

1
49

4
63

3.8%
96.2%
answered question
skipped question

15
379

Which languages do you speak? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ هﻲ اﻟﻠﻐﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﺤﺪﺛﻬﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Arabic اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ
Chinese اﻟﺼﻴﻨﻴﺔ
English اﻹﻧﺠﻠﻴﺰﻳﺔ
French اﻟﻔﺮﻧﺴﻴﺔ
German اﻷﻟﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Italian اﻹﻳﻄﺎﻟﻴﺔ
Japanese اﻟﻴﺒﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Spanish اﻷﺳﺒﺎﻧﻴﺔ
Other (please specify أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

213
2
205
65
26
4
0
3
1

62
0
61
22
4
2
0
0
0

50
0
49
8
3
0
0
1
0

65
0
66
25
12
1
1
1
3

126

Response
Percent

Response
Count

99.2%
0.5%
96.9%
30.5%
11.5%
1.8%
0.3%
1.3%
1.0%
answered question
skipped question

390
2
381
120
45
7
1
5
4
393
7

394
6

Which field of engineering are you studying? ﻣﺎهﻮ ﻓﺮع اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳﺔ اﻟﺬي ﺗﺪرﺳﻪ؟
Answer Options

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

Response
Percent

Response
Count

26
16
46
37
30
36
3
1
15

4
9
10
26
15
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
49
0
0
0
0

2
12
8
37
4
0
1
1
1

8.2%
9.5%
16.5%
25.7%
25.2%
9.3%
1.0%
0.5%
4.1%

32
37
64
100
98
36
4
2
16
169

Architectural اﻟﻤﻌﻤﺎرﻳﺔ
Civil اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ
Electrical اﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎﺋﻴﺔ
Mechanical اﻟﻤﻴﻜﺎﻧﻴﻜﻴﺔ
Computer اﻟﻜﻤﺒﻴﻮﺗﺮ
Chemical اﻟﻜﻴﻤﺎﺋﻴﺔ
Petroleum اﻟﺒﺘﺮول
Aerospace اﻟﻄﻴﺮان
Biomedical اﻟﻄﺒﻴﺔ
Please specify your concentration رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺘﺨﺼﺺ

389
11

answered question
skipped question

Do you currently work? هﻞ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﺎ؟
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify your current position ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻮﻇﻴﻔﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

137
67

29
26

17
30

23
38

127

Response
Percent

56.3%
44.0%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
206
161
366
34

What year did/will you graduate with your engineering degree? ﺳﻮف ﺗﺤﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻜﺎﻟﻮرﻳﻮس اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳﺔ؟/ﻓﻲ أي ﺳﻨﺔ ﺣﺼﻠﺖ
Answer Options
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

1
1
3
40
6
40
115
6
1
0

3
1
0
3
13
20
11
5
3
1

0
0
2
2
17
12
12
5
0
1

2
5
7
8
6
13
8
8
3
0

Response
Percent

1.6%
1.8%
3.1%
13.8%
10.9%
22.1%
38.0%
6.3%
1.8%
0.5%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
6
7
12
53
42
85
146
24
7
2
384
16

How do you currently support yourself? (Check all that apply) آﻴﻒ ﺗﻌﻮل ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Work ﻋﻤﻞ
Family Support دﻋﻢ أﺳﺮي
Savings ﻣﺪﺧﺮات
Scholarship ﻣﻨﺤﺔ دراﺳﻴﺔ
Other (please specify أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

59
160
21
3
1

29
35
5
0
1

30
28
0
0
1

34
39
7
9
2

128

Response
Percent

41.5%
71.6%
9.0%
3.3%
1.4%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
152
262
33
12
5
366
34

How will you support yourself following graduation? (Check all that apply) آﻴﻒ ﺗﻨﻮي إﻋﺎﻟﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻚ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﺨﺮج ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Work ﻋﻤﻞ
Family Support دﻋﻢ أﺳﺮي
Savings ﻣﺪﺧﺮات
Other (please specify إﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

199
21
16
5

54
7
4
1

47
5
2
0

57
13
9
2

Response
Percent

99.2%
12.8%
8.6%
2.2%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
357
46
31
8
360
40

Do you intend to work for a public or private company? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺮآﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ام ﺧﺎﺻﺔ؟
Answer Options
Public ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
Private ﺧﺎﺻﺔ
Either Private or Public أي ﻧﻮع

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

4
133
65

2
35
17

3
24
17

1
53
6

Response
Percent

2.8%
68.2%
29.2%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
10
245
105
359
41

How much would you expect to earn as an engineer in Egypt upon graduation? آﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻊ أن ﺗﻜﺴﺐ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﺨﺮج؟
Answer Options
Anticipated Salary in LE/month اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺐ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

183

47

42

129

American
University in
Cairo
55

Response
Average

Response
Total

Response
Count

3,166.22
1,035,355
answered question
skipped question

327
326
74

Have you ever worked outside Egypt before? هﻞ ﺳﺒﻖ ﻟﻚ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ؟
Answer Options

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

180
22

46
8

42
5

51
10

No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify where ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﻜﺎن

Response
Percent

Response
Count

87.9%
12.4%
answered question
skipped question

319
45
363
37

Do you intend to work abroad in the future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ ؟
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify where ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﻜﺎن

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

48
141

17
29

8
33

22
36

Response
Percent

Response
Count

28.4%
71.6%
answered question
skipped question

95
239
334
66

How much would you expect to earn as an engineer abroad? آﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻊ أن ﺗﻜﺴﺐ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟
Answer Options
Expected Salary in LE/month اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺐ اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

149

40

37

45

130

Response
Average

Response
Total

14,404.06
3,903,500
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
271
271
129

Do you intend to emigrate from Egypt in the future? هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ؟
Answer Options

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

8
24
30
7
36
82

3
8
2
1
13
19

0
8
8
1
12
14

3
10
3
0
11
29

Yes, this year  ﺧﻼل هﺬا اﻟﻌﺎم،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, in 1-2 years  ﺧﻼل ﻋﺎم أو اﺛﻨﻴﻦ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, in 3-5 years  ﺧﻼل ﺛﻼﺛﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ أﻋﻮام،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, in 6-10 years  ﺧﻼل ﺳﺘﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻋﺸﺮة أﻋﻮام،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, but I don’t have concrete plans yet  ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﺪي ﺧﻄﻂ ﻣﺤﺪدة ﺑﻌﺪ،ﻧﻌﻢ
No, I do not intend to emigrate  ﻻ أﻧﻮي اﻟﻬﺠﺮة،ﻻ

Response
Percent

4.2%
15.1%
13.0%
2.7%
21.7%
43.4%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
14
50
43
9
72
144
332
68

If you intend to work abroad or to emigrate, do you intend to return to Egypt permanently after some time abroad?  هﻞ،إذا آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج أو اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻮدة إﻟﻰ ﻣﺼﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻗﻀﺎء ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﺪة اﻟﻤﺘﻮﻗﻊ ﻗﻀﺎءهﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

18
139

6
26

7
30

15
27

131

Response
Percent

Response
Count

17.2%
82.8%
answered question
skipped question

46
222
268
132

If you plan to work abroad or emigrate, do you plan to send money back to Egypt during your time abroad?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي إرﺳﺎل،إذا آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج أو اﻟﻬﺠﺮة
أﻣﻮاﻻ ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ أﺛﻨﺎء وﺟﻮدك ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج؟
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify a percentage you plan to send back home ) ﻧﻌﻢ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

Response
Percent

Response
Count

37
109

8
23

8
27

29
15

32.0%
68.0%
answered question
skipped question

82
174
256
144

Do you know people who have emigrated already? (Check all that apply) هﻞ ﺗﻌﺮف أﻧﺎس هﺎﺟﺮوا ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Yes, my parents  واﻟﺪﻳﺎ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, my brother  أﺧﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, my sister  أﺧﺘﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, a member of my extended family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺳﻌﺔ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, a friend  ﺻﺪﻳﻖ ﻟﻲ،ﻧﻌﻢ
No, I don't know anyone who has emigrated  ﻻ أﻋﺮف أﺣﺪا هﺎﺟﺮ،ﻻ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

19
7
4
93
97
42

5
5
3
20
21
8

7
2
0
23
18
6

4
2
1
34
37
6

132

Response
Percent

10.5%
4.8%
2.4%
51.1%
52.0%
18.6%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
35
16
8
170
173
62
333
67

If you know people who have already emigrated, are you planning on going to one of the countries where they are?  هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﺬهﺎب إﻟﻰ إﺣﺪى،إن آﻨﺖ ﺗﻌﺮف أﻧﺎس هﺎﺟﺮوا
اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ هﺎﺟﺮوا إﻟﻴﻬﺎ؟
Answer Options
I do not know anyone who has emigrated already ﻻ أﻋﺮف أﺣﺪا هﺎﺟﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ
No, I do not plan to go to the same country  ﻻ أﻧﻮي اﻟﺬهﺎب إﻟﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ،ﻻ
Yes, I plan to go to the same country (Please specify the country/countries
اﻟﺪول/ أﻧﻮي اﻟﺬهﺎب إﻟﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ )رﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ،ﻧﻌﻢ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

Response
Percent

Response
Count

14
28

2
3

4
5

1
16

12.1%
29.9%

21
52

64

15

12

10

58.0%

101

answered question
skipped question

174
226

What are the main reasons you want to emigrate? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ هﻲ أهﻢ أﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻬﺠﺮة ﻟﺪﻳﻚ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
To make a higher income ﻟﻜﺴﺐ دﺧﻞ أآﺒﺮ
To send money home ﻹرﺳﺎل أﻣﻮال ﻟﺬوﻳﻚ
To get training and return ﻟﻠﺘﺪرﻳﺐ ﺛﻢ اﻟﻌﻮدة
To live outside Egypt ﻟﻠﻌﻴﺶ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
Bad living conditions in Egypt ﻟﺴﻮء أﺣﻮال اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺸﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
To join family already outside Egypt ﻟﻠﺤﺎق ﺑﺎﻻهﻞ اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﺼﺮ
To escape from family pressures and troubles ﻟﻠﻬﺮوب ﻣﻦ ﺿﻐﻮط ﻋﺎﺋﻠﻴﺔ أو ﻣﺸﻜﻼت
There are no job opportunities in Egypt ﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﻮﻓﺮ ﻓﺮص ﻋﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Other (Please specify أﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

74
15
37
30
60
5
8
30
25

22
4
10
8
18
2
2
8
3

22
8
9
11
18
3
6
10
2

18
2
10
14
15
4
0
9
9
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Response
Percent

Response
Count

72.3%
15.4%
35.1%
33.5%
59.0%
7.4%
8.5%
30.3%
20.7%
answered question
skipped question

136
29
66
63
111
14
16
57
39
188
212

What draws you to your country of destination? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺠﺬﺑﻚ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
I have friends there ﻟﺪي أﺻﺪﻗﺎءهﻨﺎك
I have relatives there ﻟﺪي أﻗﺎرب هﻨﺎك
I have a job offer there ﻟﺪي ﻋﺮض ﻋﻤﻞ هﻨﺎك
I want to live in that country أﺣﺐ أن أﻋﻴﺶ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ
More job opportunities there ﻓﺮص اﻟﻌﻤﻞ أآﺜﺮ هﻨﺎك
My destination is less crowded and/or polluted وﺟﻬﺘﻲ أﻗﻞ إزدﺣﺎﻣﺎ أو ﺗﻠﻮﺛﺎ
I could study there ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻨﻲ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ هﻨﺎك
Other (Please specify أﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

13
31
20
59
60
43
57
10

1
5
6
16
12
17
12
3

2
3
4
15
12
14
16
2

11
8
6
17
14
15
19
5

Response
Percent

14.4%
25.1%
19.3%
57.2%
52.4%
47.6%
55.6%
10.7%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
27
47
36
107
98
89
104
20
187
213

What is your source of information about your country of destination? (Check all that apply) ﻣﺎهﻮ ﻣﺼﺪر ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺗﻚ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Friends/Relatives أﻗﺎرب/أﺻﺪﻗﺎء
Internet اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ
Egyptian Authorities ﻣﺼﺎدر ﻣﺼﺮﻳﺔ رﺳﻤﻴﺔ
Personal Research ﺑﺤﺚ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ
Media (TV/Radio/Newspapers ﺟﺮاﺋﺪ/رادﻳﻮ/اﻹﻋﻼم )ﺗﻠﻔﺰﻳﻮن
Embassy of the Receiving Country ﺳﻔﺎرة اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺼﻮدة
Other (Please specify ﻣﺼﺎدر أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

76
63
4
48
35
13
6

20
19
2
13
8
4
2

20
19
2
12
11
0
0

21
15
1
18
10
2
3
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Response
Percent

75.3%
63.7%
4.9%
50.0%
35.2%
10.4%
6.0%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
137
116
9
91
64
19
11
182
218

Are there persons who will help you migrate? (Check all that apply) هﻞ هﻨﺎك ﻣﻦ ﺳﻴﺴﺎﻋﺪك ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Relatives in your destination country أﻗﺎرب ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ
Relatives in Egypt أﻗﺎرب ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Egyptian Friends in your destination country أﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻣﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ
Non-Egyptian Friends in your destination country أﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺼﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ
Friends in Egypt أﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺮ
Migration Brokers وﺳﻄﺎء هﺠﺮة
Other (Please specify أﺧﺮى )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

30
17
20
8
11
20
19

9
1
6
1
3
3
3

2
0
3
1
1
3
3

American
Response
University
Percent
in Cairo
9
33.3%
5
15.3%
8
24.7%
3
8.7%
3
12.0%
2
18.7%
4
19.3%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
50
23
37
13
18
28
29
150
250

What do you expect is the cost of migrating? آﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻊ ان ﺗﻜﻮن ﺗﻜﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﻬﺠﺮة؟
Answer Options
Expected cost in LE اﻟﺘﻜﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﺘﻮﻗﻌﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

70

17

17

19
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Response
Average

Response
Total

32,748.13
4,028,020
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
123
123
277

Have you saved up money to use for your emigration? هﻞ إدﺧﺮت أﻣﻮاﻻ ﺑﻘﺼﺪ اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة؟
Answer Options
No ﻻ
Yes (Please specify in LE ﻧﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

88
14

20
2

19
2

21
5

Response
Percent

Response
Count

86.5%
13.5%
answered question
skipped question

148
23
171
229

Are there others financially assisting you in your emigration? (Check all that apply) هﻞ هﻨﺎك ﻣﻦ ﻳﺴﺎﻋﺪك ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة؟ إﺧﺘﺮ آﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ
Answer Options
Yes, a member of my immediate family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮة،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, a member of my extended family  ﻓﺮد ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد أﺳﺮﺗﻲ اﻟﻤﻮﺳﻌﺔ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, friend/friends أﺻﺪﻗﺎء ﻟﻲ/ ﺻﺪﻳﻖ،ﻧﻌﻢ
Yes, people from my neighborhood/village اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺔ/ أﺷﺨﺎص ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﻴﺮة،ﻧﻌﻢ
No, no one is assiting me financially  ﻻ أﺣﺪ ﻳﺴﺎﻋﺪﻧﻲ ﻣﺎدﻳﺎ،ﻻ
If yes (Please specify in LE اذا أﺟﺒﺖ ﺑﻨﻌﻢ )رﺟﺎء اﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺠﻨﻴﻪ اﻟﻤﺼﺮي

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

Response
Percent

Response
Count

58
9
2
1
41

7
2
0
0
11

4
0
0
0
17

12
0
0
0
14

47.4%
6.4%
1.2%
0.6%
48.5%

81
11
2
1
83
11

answered question
skipped question

136

171
229

Do you intend to work as an engineer abroad, or will you accept a position in another industry?  أم ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﻗﺒﻮل اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل ﺁﺧﺮ ؟،هﻞ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج
Answer Options
Engineering positions only وﻇﺎﺋﻒ هﻨﺪﺳﻴﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ
Any position abroad أي وﻇﻴﻔﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺎرج

Cairo
University

Ain Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American
University in Cairo

93
18

18
5

25
0

17
9

Response
Percent

82.7%
17.3%
answered question
skipped question

Response
Count
153
32
185
215

If you intend to work as an engineer, have you already completed any necessary equivalence exams for your destination country?  هﻞ،إن آﻨﺖ ﺗﻨﻮي اﻟﻌﻤﻞ آﻤﻬﻨﺪس
أﺟﺮﻳﺖ أي إﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺼﺪهﺎ؟
American
Cairo
Ain Shams Alexandria
Response Response
Answer Options
University
University University
University
Percent
Count
in Cairo
1
1
1
1
2.3%
4
Yes, I have already completed the exams  ﻟﻘﺪ أآﻤﻠﺖ اﻹﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ،ﻧﻌﻢ
17
2
4
7
16.9%
30
In progress اﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﺑﻬﺎ ﺟﺎري
67
11
17
10
59.3%
105
I will in the future ﺳﻮف أﺟﺮﻳﻬﺎ ﻻﺣﻘﺎ
13
3
1
5
12.4%
22
No, I do not intend to  ﻻ أﻧﻮي،ﻻ
5
6
2
3
9.0%
16
No, none are needed in my country of destination  ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﻣﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ أﻗﺼﺪهﺎ،ﻻ
answered question
177
skipped question
223
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How willing would you be to migrate illegally if a legal path to migration is unavailable? ﻣﺎ ﻣﺪى إﺳﺘﻌﺪادك ﻟﻠﻬﺠﺮة ﺑﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ إذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻟﻚ ﻃﺮق ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ؟
Answer Options
Will definitely resort to illegal measures if a legal way is not available
ﺳﻮف أﻟﺠﺄ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺄآﻴﺪ إﻟﻰ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ إذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻃﺮق ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ
Very willing ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﺟﺪا
Somewhat willing ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺸﻲء
Very Reluctant ﻣﺘﺮدد ﺟﺪا
Will not resort to illegal measures if a legal path is not available ﻟﻦ أﻟﺠﺄ
إﻟﻰ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ إذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻃﺮق ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ

Cairo
University

Ain
Shams
University

Alexandria
University

American University
in Cairo

Response
Percent

Response
Count

2

0

0

0

1.1%

2

5
3
3

0
2
2

0
2
0

0
0
0

2.7%
3.7%
2.7%

5
7
5

98

21

23

27

89.9%

169

answered question
skipped question

138

188
212

